Women labour supply and country specific institutions by Jourdain De Muizon, MMJL
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of
philosophy
Women Labour Supply and
Country-Specific Institutions.
Marc Jourdain de Muizon
University College London (UCL)
Department of Economics

To Yehui, Ele and Sp

Declaration of Authorship
I, Marc Jourdain de Muizon, declare that this thesis titled “Women Labour Supply
and Country-Specific Institutions.”, and the work presented are my own. Where
information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated
in the thesis.
Signed:
Date:
5

Abstract
In this thesis, I study the influence of country-specific institutions on the labour supply
decision of prime-aged women.
In chapter 1, I use reduced-form methods, to evaluate the impact of wide changes to
the benefit system and childcare subsidies targeted at households with pre-school age
children in France. I estimate strong responses to maternity leave type benefits, and
a positive impact of childcare subsidies on mothers employment rates in the long-run.
In chapter 2, I develop and estimate a static labour supply model with part-time wage
equations as well as demand-side constraints. I can compare the elasticities estimates
and predictions from tax reform simulations to those of models assuming a unique
hourly productivity and the absence of any employment constraint. The structural
model also enables me to clearly simulate the impact of each component of the wide
policy reform studied in the first chapter.
In chapter 3, I try to understand why the number of hours worked by British married
women is lower than that of French married women. I find that in the presence of
children, British mothers are far more responsive to financial incentives. Husbands’
earnings and their interaction with childcare prices seem to play an important role.
Nevertheless, the fall in hours worked in the British households with children, despite
facing lower taxes than in France, remains somewhat puzzling. It could be mainly
attributed (in the framework used) to diﬀerent preferences.
In the final chapter, I study the impact of joint-taxation on the labour supply choices
of married women with working husbands in France. I simulate a revenue-neutral
reform that would cancel the tax penalty or gain associated with being married. I
find that the overall labour supply of these women would increase by 1.2%.
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Introduction
This thesis is interested in understanding how certain country-specific institutions
such as the benefits oﬀered to mothers following a birth, childcare prices and infras-
tructures, or specificities of the tax system (joint taxation for instance) influence the
labour supply decision of prime-aged women.
In the first chapter, I use Regression-Discontinuity, Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences and
Triple-Diﬀerences methods, to evaluate the impact of the 2004 Paje reform in France.
The reform included wide changes to the benefit system and childcare subsidies tar-
geted at households with pre-school age children. The design of the reform allows me
to diﬀerentiate between short-run and long-run eﬀects. To identify the impact of each
policy component, I exploit the variability in eligibility rules according to household
demographics. I estimate strong responses to incentives to care for a child at home af-
ter a birth, and a positive impact of childcare subsidies on mothers employment rates
in the long-run. The analysis reveals the existence of crowding-out of childcare places
among working mothers as well as continuation and possible peer-eﬀects or changes in
societal attitudes. Such mechanisms, combined with a slow adjustment of the child-
care market appear critical to understand the magnitude of the overall employment
changes induced by the policies. The results suggest that subsidies to private carers
are most eﬃcient at inducing mothers to join the labour force, in groups where the
employment rates are neither very high nor very low. Generous income transfers for
maternal leave motivate women to take-up the program for their first child but does
not impact their decision to take it up for subsequent children.
In the second chapter, I develop and estimate a static labour supply model with
part-time and full-time wage equations as well as demand-side constraints. This
allows me to understand to what extent the common assumption in the literature
of a unique hourly productivity and the absence of any diﬃculties to find work may
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aﬀect the elasticities estimates and the predictions from tax reform simulations. I
can also simulate the overall reform studied in the first chapter to check which model
specification predicts the Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences evaluations most accurately. The
structural model finally allows me to clearly simulate the impact of each component
of the wide policy reform studied in the first chapter. This additional robustness
check confirms the main results of chapter 1 that were obtained using reduced-form
methods and exploiting variation in eligibility rules.
In the third chapter, I use the model of chapter 2, to understand why the number
of hours worked by British married women is lower than that of French married
women. Interestingly, the labour supply of married women diﬀers a lot along the
intensive margin when their children are young. Using this structural approach, I am
able to control for diﬀerences in tax rates, childcare prices, part-time wage penalties
and rationing on the labour market. I find that in the presence of children, British
mothers are far more responsive to financial incentives. Husbands’ earnings and their
interaction with childcare prices seem to play an important role in explaining the cross-
country hours of work. Nevertheless, the fall in hours worked in the British households
with children, despite facing lower taxes than in France, remains somewhat puzzling
in the light of conventional explanations. It could be mainly attributed to diﬀerent
preferences. The framework used cannot diﬀerentiate whether it is the preferences or
the cost of work technologies that diﬀer across the two countries.
In the final chapter, I study the impact of joint-taxation on the labour supply choices
of married women with working husbands in France. Using the model estimated in
the previous chapters, I simulate a revenue-neutral reform that would cancel the tax
penalty or gain associated with being married. I find that the particpation rate of
these women would increase by 0.7 percentage point and their overall labour supply
would increase by 1.2%. As expected, the changes would be larger for highly educated
women and those married to a high-earner.
16
1 Maternity Leave and Childcare
Subsidies in France: the Paje
Reform
1.1 Overview
Using Regression-Discontinuity and Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences methods, I evaluate the
impact of wide changes to the benefit system and childcare subsidies targeted at
households with pre-school age children in France. The design of the reform allows me
to diﬀerentiate between short-run and long-run eﬀects. I estimate strong responses
to incentives to care for a child at home after a birth, and a positive impact of
childcare subsidies on mothers employment rates in the long-run. The analysis reveals
the existence of crowding-out of childcare places among working mothers as well
as continuation and possible peer-eﬀects. Such mechanisms, combined with a slow
adjustment of the childcare market appear critical to understand the magnitude of the
overall employment changes induced by the policies. The results suggest that subsidies
to private carers are most eﬃcient at inducing mothers to join the labour force, in
groups where the employment rates are neither very high nor very low. Generous
income transfers for maternal leave motivate women to take-up the program for their
first child but does not impact their decision to take it up for subsequent children.
17
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1.2 Introduction:
On January 1st 2004, the French government modified significantly the structure of
benefits and childcare subsidies targeted at households with children of pre-school age
(three years old in France). Every child born after that date pushed the household
under the new “Paje” regime. Other families remained eligible to the old “APE”
regime only. This specific design allows for a particularly nice identification strategy.
I can evaluate the impact of the reform on a treated and eligible group, while the
outcomes of a treated and non-eligible group can still be observed nationwide.
The reform comprised two big changes. On the one hand, mothers who just had their
first child became eligible to a non means-tested “stay-home” subsidy. They could
extend their maternity leave by up to six months. On the other hand, the eligibility
thresholds to a monthly income transfers were strongly increased and the generosity
of childcare subsidies significantly increased. For reasons explained later in the text, I
focus on households with pre-school age children with one or two children only. These
households represent about four-fifths of all the households with pre-school children.
To identify the impact of each policy change, I will exploit the variability in eligibility
rules according to household demographics, and estimate the same specifications on
samples of households where the youngest is less than one year old and between the
age of one to three.
In 1994, the French government extended the stay-home benefits (APE) to mothers
of two children and that reform is studied in Piketty (2005). He finds a strong direct
negative impact on employment rates for this group of women. He also finds a negative
impact on women who have a third child and previously claimed the benefit following
the birth of the second child (what I will call “habit” eﬀects ). In Norway in 1999,
a similar “cash-for-care” transfer was implemented. Schole (2004) estimates strong
negative eﬀects on maternal employment rates induced by the reform. Looking at
the introduction of paternity leave in Norway in 1993, Dahl et al (2013) find evidence
of strong take-up immediately after the policy introduction. They also highlight
the importance of peer-eﬀects that amplify the program take-up rates in the long-
run. While parents respond strongly to the incentives to stay home when children
are of pre-school age, many papers also estimate the impact of childcare availability
18
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and prices on mothers’ labour supply decisions. Using discontinuities in the price
of childcare for households with diﬀerent incomes in Norway, Black et al (2013) find
very little impact of childcare subsidies on care utilization and parental labour force
participation. Hardoy & Schone (2010) evaluate the impact of decreasing the price of
childcare and increasing coverage in Norway in 2006. While mothers’ labour supply
was already high, they find a positive impact on the extensive margin but none on the
hours of work decision. In Sweden, Lundin et al (2008) find that cheaper childcare
prices in the context of universal childcare cannot stimulate an already high female
labour supply. The Canadian reform in Quebec in 1997 that decreased substantially
the price of childcare while increasing the provision of childcare slots was evaluated in
Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008) and Baker,Gruber and Milligan (2008). Both papers
report a strong increase in maternal employment rates and hours of work. Baker et
al find some evidence of crowding-out in childcare modes. Overall, it appears that
increasing childcare coverage and decreasing its prices has positive eﬀects on maternal
labour supply. But in a context of high labour supply, simply decreasing the price of
childcare may not significantly increase the labour supply of mothers.
This paper brings further evidence to this body of literature. On the one hand, I iden-
tify negative eﬀects of “stay-home” subsidies similar to Schone(2004) and Piketty(2005).
Their impact is accentuated in the long-run through possible peer eﬀects as in Dahl et
al (2013) but not by habit eﬀects as in Piketty (2005). On the other hand, I find ev-
idence of childcare subsidies having a positive impact on mothers’ employment rates,
and particularly for groups who did not have a very high (nor very low) employment
rate prior to the reform. The short-run and long-run impact of these subsidies diﬀer
strongly in magnitude and across demographic groups. Availability of childcare places
and crowding-out among working mothers seem to prevent the impact of these subsi-
dies to fully materialise in the immediate aftermath of the policy change. The overall
net gains in employment appear modest relative to the costs of the reform. All these
results suggest that subsidies to private carers may not be a very cost-eﬃcient way to
incentivise mothers of young children to join the labour force.
Piketty (2005) estimates a small impact of the “cash-for-care” program on fertility.
The data available does not allow me to study the response of natality choices to
the policy with precision. Overall, fertility seems to follow its pre-policy trend. The
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policy might have had a small impact on the decision of mothers to have a second or
third child, but I cannot assert this with strong confidence. I discuss the evolution of
fertility in France throughout the first decade of the 21st Century below.
1.3 Preliminary evidence:
1.3.1 Childcare availability in the period under study:
In France, children are allowed to go to school from the age of three. Prior to that,
there exists two main types of formal care: the “creches” or public kindergarten and
the “assistantes maternelles” or private carers1. These private carers are allowed to
look after up to three children. Their cost is subsidised by the government and was
decreased by the 2004 reform.
Figure 1.1 shows that the assistantes maternelles have been an increasingly popular
mode of care in the first decade of the 21st Century in France. Their number kept
rising after the policy was implemented. The growth rate was similar to the years
prior to the policy change. A slight modification in the data methodology between
2001 and 2002 explains the apparent stagnation in the number of carers around that
time. Figure 1.2 represents the number of places available per 100 children aged
between one and three years old in the two main types of care. The number of places
available in kindergarten rose very slowly from about 14 to 15 per 100 children within
5 years after the reform. The increase in number of places available was far more
significant in the private-carers market. We just saw that the number of Assistantes
maternelles kept increasing which would explain the increase in that ratio. Fertility
was not falling in that period, so it could not be explained by a drop in the number
of children in that age category.2
1There also exists “Gardes a domicile”. These private carers look after the household’s children
in the household’s home. They are more expensive and the subsidies for this type of care were
aﬀected by the reform. Only 2% of the children are cared for by these private carers.
2An assistante maternelle is “accreditated” (allowed) to look after a certain number of children
by the local authorities. The number of children to care for increases with seniority and other
criteria.
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The hourly wage of nannies reported in the Labour Force Surveys is displayed in Figure
1.3. It increased at the same long-run pace as that of other women. It stagnated for
a few years around the time of the reform but started increasing again from 2006
onwards.
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Figure 1.3: Wages of nannies per year
The hourly rate paid to a nanny cannot fall below a threshold defined as a proportion
of the national minimum wage. In 2005, this threshold was increased from .225 to
.281 of the minimum wage (that could explain the apparent increase the hourly wages
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from 2006 onwards). There also exists an upper limit to the hourly rate a nanny
could charge. The childcare subsidies can be claimed by the parents only if the nanny
charges less than .63 of the hourly minimum wage. So the price paid to a nanny is the
result of a bargaining process between parents and the carer, where the agreed hourly
price is set between these two bounds. The price being bounded, it is likely that
the allocation of places in the market is not simply the result of price adjustments.
Priority rules for siblings, friends networks, or previous employment history between
the parents and the nanny may play an important role in the allocation of scarce
childcare places. It should also be noted that the average wage of nannies varies
across regions, and appears to be weakly correlated with the number of available
places for young children in the region (Figure 1.4), suggesting that other factors
than the price per hour paid explain the allocation of childcare places.
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0 .2 .4 .6 .8
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Mean local wage of nannies Fitted values
as a function of local childcare supply
Net hourly wages of nannies in 2006
Figure 1.4: Hourly price of nannies and regional supply of care places
1.3.2 Benefit take-ups:
Prior to the reform, the female labour supply was generally increasing in France,
and as a result, Figure 1.5 shows that the number of claimants to childcare subsidies
for private carers was increasing. A break is still apparent around the time of the
reform. While at first sight, the trend may not have changed much, it appears that
an extra forty to fifty thousand households claimed these new childcare subsidies. It
is interesting to note that this occurred while no apparent jump in the number of
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carers occurred. This suggests that some parents who would have been using private
carers but not claiming the benefits (probably because of high utility costs relative to
low monetary gains) would now claim the benefits post-2004.
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Figure 1.5: Number of childcare subsidies claimants
Figure 1.6 focuses on the evolution of the total number of claimants for the income
transfer payments (called “Allocation de base”) that were modified by the reform.
An increase in the eligibility thresholds, resulted in about half a million households of
pre-school children to receive the monthly income transfer. The apparent delay in the
picture is explained by the small number of the households with children of pre-school
age who woul be eligible to the new policy (the date of birth of the youngest child is
what allocates households to the new system). The proportion of households claiming
that benefit (among all households with young children) increased by around 15 to
20 percentage points.
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Figure 1.6: Number of claimants to the income transfer
Figures 1.7 and 1.8 report the number of claimants in France to the “stay-home” or
“cash-for-care” subsidies. These income transfers are not conditional on household
income but conditional on past-work experience. Should a mother of a pre-school
child decide to stop work, or decrease her hours of work to part-time, she is eligible to
a monthly benefit. Mothers of one child were not eligible previously. The increase in
the number of claimants in 2004 and 2005 by about 80,000 could mainly be attributed
to this population (each year about 300 000 women have their first child, about two-
third of them worked full-time in 2003, so that another hundred thousand became
eligible to the benefit). When splitting further the claimants in the fourth graph, it
appears at first sight that a lot of the increase was driven by women claiming the
benefit while working part-time. More surprisingly the number of mothers claiming
the benefit to leave employment fell after 2005. This picture might suggest that many
women entered the labour market to work part-time as a result of the policy change.
Nevertheless, we will see that this story is incomplete. My analysis reveals that the
hours of work where not aﬀected by the policy. Overall, many women were encouraged
to enter the labour market (thanks to childcare subsidies), but the prevalence of part-
time work among the employed did not increase. So the correct interpretation of
that picture, is as follows: immediately after the policy, new mothers became eligible
and increased the total number of claimants. After the policy implementation, more
mothers of pre-school children re-entered slowly the labour market (as a result of
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the childcare subsidy). Those that chose to work part-time became eligible for the
part-time income benefit, but those that chose full-time jobs, did not claim any of
those income transfers. So there are two dynamics at work behind that graph: on the
one hand, an increase in the number of eligible households pushing up the number
of claimants immediately after 2004, and an overall fall in the non-employment of
households whose eligibility was not aﬀected by the policy change that materialises
slowly over the years. This last eﬀect was explained by childcare subsidies and not
incentives to work part-time of these “cash-for-care” transfers3.
50
0
55
0
60
0
98 99  00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
year
Pre Post 
Number of claimants for stay−home subsidies, 000’s
Figure 1.7: Number of claimants to
the CLCA
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
98 99  00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
year
Pre, Stop work Pre, Part−time work 
Post, Stop work Post, Part−time work 
Split between out−of−work & Part−time
Number of claimants for stay−home subsidies, 000’s
Figure 1.8: Number of claimants per
component of CLCA
1.3.3 Labour supply of mothers:
Figures 1.9 to 1.12 should illustrate the points discussed above more clearly. They
represent the employment rates and working hours of the demographic groups that
responded most strongly. For each age/family size group I report the employment
rates of mothers as a function of the timing of birth of the youngest child. We
do observe an immediate fall in the employment of mothers who became eligible to
the generous stay-home subsidies, and that drop was accentuated over time. The
3The increase by 15% in the amount transferred for the part-time work “stay-home” subsidies may
also have pushed some mothers who were employed part-time but not claiming it, to take-up the
income transfer without aﬀecting their working hours.
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employment rates of mothers of two children with the youngest aged between one
and three years old responded to the policy with a certain delay. In neither groups,
was the intensive margin of work aﬀected. Similar graphs for the other demographic
groups are reported in the appendix.
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1.3.4 Fertility:
I use the population statistics from the INSEE to construct the indicators reported
in this section. Unfortunately, the Enquete Emploi surveys are not precise enough to
recover any interesting pattern4. The number of children born per 100 women aged
15 to 49 has been constantly rising between 1998 and 2010 in France (as shown in
Figure 1.13).
This is particularly true for the number of first births per woman. The “stay-home”
subsidies that now became available to this group of women may not have had any
impact on their decision to start a family. The diﬀerence with the results in Piketty
(2005) could be due to the much shorter duration of the program here (6 months
versus three years in Piketty (2005)).
The picture is diﬀerent for households with two or more children (Figure 1.15 and
16). The probability of having a second child was declining before 2004 and the trend
was completely inverted after 2004. This also appears true (to a smaller extent) for
the probability of having more than two children. It would be interesting to pursue
a careful econometric study and highlight the statistical significance of the changes
and the possible mechanisms at work, but this seems very challenging with the data
at hand. The policy increased the number of middle-class eligible households to a
birth-bonus and a monthly income transfer for the first three years of the child5. A
few channels could explain a change in the attitude towards fertility of these mothers
and might be identified with more information. For instance, the increase in second
child births may be explained by women who took-up the “stay-home” subsidies with
their first-child. Having experienced a long maternity leave, these women may not be
worried about the prospects of longer time out of the labour force following the birth of
another child. If that is the case, lower educated and poorer women would be the ones
explaining that apparent change in natality. Another possibility would be a direct
income eﬀect. The newly eligible households experienced an increase in their potential
4The change in the data collection process from annually in February or March of each year to
quarterly in 2003, makes it also diﬃcult to build an exact and comparable measure of fertility
indicators pre and post 2004.
5For example in 2007, this birth bonus was worth €855 and the monthly income transfer €172. As
discussed above, the number of eligible households increased by about 15 percentage points due
to a large increase in the income thresholds for claimants.
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disposable income should they have more children than previously desired. The jump
in natality should then be observed in the middle of the income distribution. Finally,
the reform made it easier to combine work with diﬀerent care arrangements. I show
below that this was particularly true for mothers of two children. That could also
have increased the probability of women to conceive a second (or third) child. That
hypothesis may influence the fertility decisions of households along all the income
distribution.
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1.4 The French subsidy system for pre-school aged
children and reform details:
1.4.1 General presentation.
In France, children can enter school from the age of three, where they can be cared for
all day. Households with dependent children generally receive a tax rebate called the
“Quotient Familial” and unconditional children benefits (for families of two children
and more). This chapter focuses particularly on the changes that occurred in 2004 to
the benefits and childcare subsidies system for pre-school children. In France, mothers
can take up to three months of maternity leave after a child’s birth 6. After that if
they do not wish to go back to go work, they can stay out of work until the child (if he
is not the first one) turns three years old (while being guaranteed by their employer
a position when they decide to come back). They can claim a stay-home benefit in
that case. While the child is too young to go to school, diﬀerent care options are
available. Around one in eight children is cared for in a kindergarten, about a third
are looked after by professional nannies and the rest are using informal modes of care
(usually family). The benefits directed at households with pre-school children (known
as PAJE) are mainly composed of three elements:
1. A fixed income transfer that is means-tested but not tapered away (the “Allo-
cation de base”).
2. A stay-home benefit that is not means-tested (the CLCA or “Complement de
Libre Choix d’Activite”). If the mother decides to stop work completely or to
reduce her hours of work in order to look after the child, she would receive a
fixed benefit every month (the benefit is higher if she stops work completely)
unconditional of the household resources. In order to claim it, she needs to have
been in employment for a minimum duration in the past.
3. Childcare subsidies to cover some of the costs incurred by using a professional
nanny (CMG or “ Complement du Mode de Garde”) these are means-tested and
6The maternity leave is normally 6 weeks pre-birth and 10 weeks post-birth, but three weeks pre-
birth can be substituted for 3 weeks post-birth, bringing the maximum duration to 13 weeks
post-birth.
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their generosity depends on the household’s income bracket. They are slightly
diﬀerent if the nanny looks after the children in the family home (“Garde a
domicile”, only about 2% of children concerned ) or the nanny cares for children
for diﬀerent families in her own home (“Assistante Maternelle”, more than 30%
of children concerned)7.
Table 1.1 summarises how households were aﬀected by the changes according to their
demographics:
Youngest child born
Before 2003: Old system 2004 & After: New system
3-11
months
1-3 y.o 3-11
months
1-3 y.o
1 child Stay-home benefits No No Yes NoChildcare subsidies Yes Yes Yes,
increased
generosity
Yes,increased
generosity
2 children Stay-home benefits Yes Yes Yes YesChildcare subsidies Yes Yes Yes,increased
generosity
Yes,increased
generosity
Table 1.1: Summary of the policy changes on diﬀerent household groups
1.4.2 The details of the reform.
On April 29th 2003, the government announced the changes to the system that would
aﬀect every child born after January 1st 2004. Mothers could not delay a pregnancy
in order to enter the new system. The government modified all the benefits directed
to households with pre-school children. The main changes could be summarised as
follows: an increase in the generosity of the childcare subsidies that became conditional
7These childcare subsidies are also available for children between the age of three and six but are
about half the value of those for children below three years old. Most of these children go to
school, so these subsidies are less popular anyway. I have looked at this group, but did not find
any significant impact of the subsidies’changes so I decided to focus only on pre-school children.
The results for this group are available upon request.
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on working, an increase in the number of eligible households to each type of benefit,
and an increase in the amount transferred when a mother decreases her hours of work
from full-time to part-time post-birth. I will now focus more specifically on each
one of them. I also provide in the appendix two tables putting into perspective each
aspect of the benefits and how they were modified 8.
1.4.2.1 Income transfer (“Allocation de base”):
Eligible families receive 171 € per month until the child’s third birthday. Only house-
holds whose income is below a (household composition) specific threshold are eligible.
For instance in 2006, the basic threshold (a couple with one child and one worker) was
32,328€ under the new system while it was 23,598€ in the old system. This increase
in the “thresholds” augmented the percentage of eligible families by 15 percentage
points in the population of interest. This change in thresholds aﬀected mothers dif-
ferently. For mothers of one child aged one to three, this may result in a shift out of
the budget constraint resulting in a pure income eﬀect. For mothers of two children,
the eﬀect is more subtle. I reproduce and discuss diﬀerent budget constraints in the
appendix (figures 1.29 to 1.36).
1.4.2.2 Stay-home benefits (“CLCA”):
Prior to the reform, these benefits were not available to women who had their first
child. These transfers are not means-tested. Piketty (2005) studied the extension of
these subsidies to mothers of two in 1994. In 2004, women who had their first child
became eligible, but only for six months after the end of maternity leave. If the mother
decreases her hours worked to 80% of full-time (28 hours a week), 50% of Full-time or
stops work completely, she receives a monthly benefit of respectively 305, 404, 531€
(if she does not receive the income transfer “Allocation de base”, if she does than 171
Euros are deducted from these transfers). The part-time payments were increased by
15% under the new system. The conditions on past work experience became more
8Note that in 2006, families where the youngest child is below three years old but born before
January 2004 would still be on the old system. 2006 is the last year where such a situation would
occur, and it is the reason why I choose to report the changes in thresholds and benefits for that
particular year.
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stringent (having worked for two years prior to the child’s birth, within a time-frame
that depends on the number of children already born).
1.4.2.3 Childcare subsidies:
First of all, the childcare subsidies were renamed the Complement de Libre Choix
du mode de garde (Cmg). They became available exclusively to working parents
(in 2006, to be eligible, you needed to work and have a monthly salary of at least
374 Euros for lone parents and 748 Euros if in couple). If your child is being cared
for by a private carer (either “assistante maternelle” or “garde a domicile”), part of
her salary is paid by the government (depending on household income), and 100% of
the employer contributions are paid by the government if an “assistante maternelle” is
used (only 50% of the employer contributions if “garde a domicile” used). A minimum
of 15% of the employee’s salary is paid by the household in any case. The daily salary
of an “assistante maternelle” needs to be below 42,20Eur. per child. In the old
system, the government would not pay part of the “garde a domicile”’s salary and the
subsidies could be claimed by non-working households. The generosity of the subsidy
paying a portion of the carer’s wage varies according to three income thresholds and
the number of children that are being cared for. Table 1.2 summarizes the thresholds
and benefits in 2006 for couples with two incomes under the old and the new system:
32
1.4 The French subsidy system for pre-school aged children and reform details:
Number of children 1 2
System Old New Old New
First threshold Income < 17,593 19,225 21,653 22,135
Max.benefit per child 218.62 374.75 218.62 374.75
Second threshold Income < 24,190 42,722 29,773 49,188
Max.benefit per child 172.87 267.69 172.87 267.69
Third threshold Income > 24,190 42,722 29,773 49,188
Max.benefit per child 143.24 160.60 143.24 160.60
Note: The reported amounts are for couples in 2006
Table 1.2: Income thresholds and childcare subsidies pre-post reform
1.4.3 Predictions from economic theory:
The neo-classical model of labour supply can be used to predict the reaction of mothers
with young children to the policy changes. The new eligibility to the stay-home
benefits should lead to a fall in the employment rate of mothers who had their first
child (as long as the child is younger than 11 months old) through a strong income
eﬀect and particularly for low-earners. The more generous childcare subsidies should
lead to an increase in employment and/or hours worked (conditional on the supply of
carers increasing) for women everywhere along the income distribution. The increase
in the incentives to work 28 hours could lead to a rise in employment combined with a
fall in average hours worked. I find clear evidence of the impact of stay-home benefits
and childcare subsidies on employment rates but no impact of the higher incentives
to work part-time.9
The reform may also induce some behavioral response through other channels such
as : habit eﬀects (households get used to taking-up programs), continuation eﬀects
(mothers continue to stay out of work longer than the duration of the program), and
9The increase in the generosity of part-time work transfers was financed by making the past-work
eligibility criteria more stringent
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peer eﬀects or changes in societal attitudes..
1.5 Results on labour supply choices using the Labour
Force Surveys:
1.5.1 Baseline specification:
In this section I analyse the impact of the policy change on employment variables
for mothers of young children. The data used in this section are the French Labour
Force Surveys from 2001 to 200910. The data sets contain detailed information on
household demographics such as age of all the members, education levels, region of
residence and very detailed descriptions of their employment status. The date of birth
of the youngest child allows me to allocate the household to the treated and eligible
or treated and non-eligible groups. I focus on households where the mother is above
18 years old.
As explained above, I focus only on households with children of pre-school age as they
were the most aﬀected by the policy changes. I focus only on households with less
than three children. The benefit system was further modified for this latter group in
2006 and the employment decisions of large families may also be strongly aﬀected by
diﬀerent considerations. I will try to estimate the short-run and long-run impacts of
the policy using (respectively) a regression discontinuity and a diﬀ-in-diﬀ framework.
There are many reasons to believe the magnitude (and even signs) of the eﬀect may
diﬀer along diﬀerent timescales. When focusing on the childcare subsidies, the supply
of private providers may be fixed in the short-run and it may take a few quarters or
years, for the private care market to settle to a new equilibrium (especially when the
mothers competing for carers have access to two diﬀerent subsidy systems of varying
generosities). There could also be confusion in the short-run. Mothers with a child of
10Prior to 2003, the surveys were collected once a year and were called Enquete Emploi. In 2003,
it was replaced by a quarterly rolling panel (Enquete Emploi en Continu) where each household
was interviewed for six consecutive quarters. The procedure for data collection was very similar
between the two surveys. I check that the results are not aﬀected by any discrepancy in the data
sets.
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pre-school age would be eligible to diﬀerent benefits depending on the child’s birth.
Women who previously had a child and would have received the old benefits, would be
granted the new benefits, while the old benefits were still available to other households.
Peer eﬀects could also play an important role. Dahl et al (2013) find evidence that
parents did not necessarily respond immediately to an extension of paternity leave in
Norway. Mothers of one child, who could stay out of work longer than previously, may
not dare to ask their employer at first. A positive feedback of co-workers and relatives
who claimed these stay-home benefits may play a crucial role in the mother’s decision.
It might also be the case, that mothers anticipated the child arrival a few years ahead
and smoothed their income according to the entitlements they would receive under
the old system.
I run the regressions separately for households with one or two children. I further
split these groups into one where the youngest child is between 3 months to one year
old (the legal maternity leave duration is 3 months in France, so I omit observations
where the youngest child is below 3 months old) and another one where the youngest
is between one and three years old. As we saw previously, women who had their first
child had strong incentives to stay home for six months after their maternity leave.
Mothers might also combine the maternity leave with some normal vacation leave. As
a precaution, I include women with a child up to 11 months old instead of cutting oﬀ
mothers when the child is older than nine and half months old (13 weeks of maternity
leave plus 26 weeks of stay-home benefits). I report the results for being employed
as the policy appeared to have no impact on the choice of labour supply along the
intensive margin across all groups.
In all the regressions, I include a set of control variables that are likely to aﬀect the
labour supply decision. These variables are: the education level, age and its square,
age of the partner and its square, a dummy for being married, living in Paris, dummies
for the quarter of interview, the age of the youngest child in months and a dummy
if the youngest was less than two years old or six months old, and an age-group
categorical variable. In the last sub-section, I run a battery of specification checks to
ensure that the results found are not too sensitive to this baseline specification. The
estimated parameters identify intention-to-treat eﬀects.
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1.5.2 Identification strategy:
1.5.2.1 short-run impact: regression discontinuity framework
To measure the eﬀects of the policy in the short-run, I use a regression discontinuity
framework.The regression takes the following form:
yi = α+ 1[t ≥ c](fpost(t− c) + γ) + 1[t < c]fpre(c− t) + β￿Xi + ei
where f() are functions controlling for diﬀerent trends in the period before and after
the policy (I will estimate f as a linear trend). The months before the policy change
are represented as (c − t), and after as (t − c). The control variables Xi are the set
of controls described earlier. The coeﬃcient of interest capturing the impact of the
policy is γ. I restrict the analysis to women with a child born within a 12 quarters
window around the policy.11
1.5.2.2 Total impact: diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach
The intuition here is that of a diﬀ-in-diﬀ where the treatment group are mothers
of young children and the control group mothers of older children (8-18 years old).
The total impact of the policy can be recovered by comparing the outcomes of the
treatment group in 2007,2008 and 2009 (three years after the policy implementation)
versus 2001,2002 and 2003 with those of the control group during the same time-
frame. Two reasons motivate the choice of such a large time-scale: if the childcare
subsidy increased the demand for nannies, the private-care market would need a few
years for the supply of licensed nannies to increase. More importantly, by 2007 no
more mothers would be under the old benefit system for the groups of interest. The
estimated parameter γTotal is:
γTotal = (y07−08−09T − y01−02−03T )− (y07−08−09C − y01−02−03C )
11I have estimated the regression using local linear methods. The issue with that procedure was
that the optimal bandwidth was either one or two months around the policy change. There are
very few observations within that time window (about 100 on each side) and the estimates are
very imprecise.
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where the outcome variable y is a dummy equal to one if employed. To estimate that
parameter, I run the following regression:
yi = α+ β￿TTreated+ β￿CControl + γTotal(Treated ∗ Control) + β￿xXi + ei
where the interaction term γTotalcaptures the DID estimate, and the variables X are
the set of controls described earlier, to which an interaction between the age group
variable with a time-dummy is included to control for the diﬀerent age structures of
the control and treated groups.
1.5.3 Estimates from the baseline specifications:
Overall, the policy, significantly and strongly decreased the employment rates of moth-
ers whose first child is younger than one by four percentage points in the short-run
and up to nine percentage points in the long-run. When the only child was between
one to three years old, this short-run eﬀect was very similar but seems to have been
attenuated in the long-run (resulting in no movement in the employment rate). Re-
garding mothers of two children, the policy also had no impact in the short-run but
appears to have had a significant and positive impact in the long-run (nearly three
percentage points) when the youngest was between one and three years old.
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Age of youngest 3-11 months old 1-3 years old
Num. children 1 2 1 2
Employment rates in 2003 .6695 .5251 .7042 .4846
short-run: RD estimates -.0424* -.0303 -.0409*** -0.0029
(.0233) (.0254) (.0139) (.0151)
N 5481 4910 14730 14034
Total impact: DID estimates -.0897*** -.0429* -.0088 .0270*
(.0243) (.0222) (.0166) (.0145)
N 29023 29948 36983 37398
Table 1.3: Policy impact on employment rates of mothers of young children
So far, the results are in line with the predictions from section 4 except for mothers of
one child aged one to three years old. The eﬀects of the policy took some time to fully
materialise. In section 6, I will exploit some of the specificities of the policy design to
better understand how the employment changes occurred between the short-run and
the long-run (particularly for mothers of one child aged one to three).
1.5.4 Robustness checks and heterogeneous impact:
In this section, I run a battery of specification checks and report the results in the
appendix. The first part is adding diﬀerent controls to the baseline specification and
clustering the standard errors at the treatment level (months of birth to the policy)
for the regression discontinuity and at the time of interview for the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences. The variables I add to the baseline specification are time dummies, a
dummy to control for the fact that the collection of labour force surveys went from
annual to quarterly in 2003 (Enquete Emploi became Enquete Emploi en Continu),
or the local unemployment rates at time of interview. I try to control for the local
availability and price of local childcare by adding time-regional dummies, and the
distance of average nannies wages in the region to the national average in the years
of observation. To better understand the possible heterogeneous eﬀects of the policy,
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I run the baseline specifications focusing only on high (high-school and more) or low
education mothers, married or single mothers, mothers whose partner is a low-earner
(wage below the median male wage) or high-earner (wage above the median male
wage). Finally, to grasp the potential size and sign of the income transfers threshold
changes on employment, I drop observations whose partner’s earnings are in-between
the old and new income thresholds.
For the regression discontinuity, I also modify the time-window to 8 quarters and 16
quarters around the policy change. In the DID specification, I check that the results
are not sensitive to the choice of control group and also run the regression on a placebo
group (mothers of children aged six to eight years old).
Looking at the regression discontinuity (Tables 1.13 and 1.14), the magnitude of the
eﬀects do not vary much with the diﬀerent specifications. The significance levels seem
to be more sensitive to the specification adopted though. Overall, the regression dis-
continuity may be too sensitive to the specification adopted to be able to conclude
with confidence that the policy impact was statistically diﬀerent from zero. In Sec-
tion 6, I use another identification strategy to recover the short-run impact of the
policy change. The results will be more precise and in line with what the regression
discontinuity framework seems to imply.
The results of the Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ (Tables 1.15 to 1.16) hardly change with any of the
checks. For mothers with two children whose youngest is below one. The fall in their
employment rates stays significant in the majority of the alternative specifications,
and its size is not aﬀected. The impact was concentrated on low educated women
whose partner is in the upper-half of the income distribution. This result may seem
counter-intuitive at first, but these women probably do not have high incentives to
stay in the labour market, and are now not afraid to claim the stay-home subsidies
(either from seeing the experience of peers, or changing societal attitudes towards
maternal leave). For women with two children where the youngest is one to three, high
education, married women, and those with a high-earning partner respond positively
and strongly to the policy while this is the exact opposite for low education mothers.
In the group of mothers with one child younger than one, the policy has impacted
strongly married women and not at all single women. For mothers of one child aged
one to three, all the results are in line with the main estimates. Only the case of
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single mothers appears an outlier. One should be careful in trying to interpret too
much out of it, the result is entirely driven by a few single mothers aged above 40
(the exclusion of these hundred observations ) cancels all the apparent eﬀect.
1.5.5 Habit eﬀects:
To investigate further the overall negative response of mothers with two children
whose youngest is below one, I define “habit” eﬀects as one’s habit to claim benefits.
Here, it is possible that the women who received the stay-home subsidy for their first
child were more likely to stop working and take-up these subsidies once they had a
second child. Having experienced a period out of the labour force already, they may
feel more inclined to repeat the experience at the birth of a second child. To separate
this indirect eﬀect of the policy from the direct impact of benefit changes, I separate
women with two children (whose youngest is of pre-school age) between those who
would be eligible to the childcare subsidies but did not have the possibility to take
long-leave at the birth of the first child, with those who could have. The first group is
composed of women whose second child was born post-2004 but their first child was
born pre-2004, while the second group is composed of women whose second and first
child were born post-2004. Figures 1.17 and 1.18 do not seem to show the presence of
any of these eﬀects. Whether women took-up the stay-home subsidy and six-months
leave after the birth of the first child does not appear to play a role in their decision to
leave employment and claim these subsidies at the birth of a second child. It is very
challenging to identify such a mechanism with a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence framework as
no control group can be easily found. I run a regression discontinuity and a simple
diﬀerence with a similar specification to the ones above to check that the birth year of
the first child had no impact on the employment decision at the second child’s birth.
I report the results in Table 1.23 in the appendix.
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In the next section I evaluate the diﬀerences between the short-run and final impact of
the policy further. To shed some light on what may have occurred in the immediate
years following the introduction of the new benefit system, I estimate the policy
impact with a diﬀerent approach.
1.6 Decomposing the short-run and long-run further:
1.6.1 The short-run impacts:
The design of the policy allows me to recover what I will call the “direct” and “indirect”
impacts in the short-run. In the years following the policy, mothers of a certain group
would be receiving diﬀerent benefits and subsidies while on the same labour and
childcare markets. I can then recover the impact of the policy on these “treated”
mothers receiving the policy (“direct impact”) by comparing them to the “treated”
group not receiving the policy (“indirect impact”). This last group (“treated but not
receiving the policy”) could be thought as a placebo group, checking that we are truly
identifying the eﬀects of the policy. Once again, I will use a control group (mothers
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of older children) to infer what would have been the outcome of the “treated but not
receiving the policy”, if nothing had changed in the institutional environment.
The two graphs illustrate the idea:
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Figure 1.19: Employment rates of
first-time mother, by treatment
status
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An example might clarify matters. Let’s focus on the group of mothers with a child
between one year-old and three years old in Figure 1.19. In January 2006 say, the
mothers with children below twenty-four months old would be on the new policy, while
those with children above twenty-four month old would be on the old policy. The
diﬀerence in employment rates between these two groups is what I call the “direct”
impact. The diﬀerence in employment rates between these mothers with children
above twenty-four months old and its “hypothetical” employment rates (inferred using
an unaﬀected control group) is what I call the “indirect” eﬀect. So, I define the short-
run period as the time where the group of mothers with pre-school children could
be split between eligible and ineligible mothers. Evaluating the “indirect” eﬀect is
done through a DID technique, while the “direct” eﬀect is evaluated through what I
call a quasi-DDD (triple diﬀerences). Because, I cannot separate the treatment group
between eligibles and non-eligibles in the pre-policy period, but I can in the short-run
post-policy period, this estimator takes the form of a modified triple diﬀerence in
diﬀerences (comparing the outcomes of only two groups in the pre-period and three
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groups in the post-period).
More formally, the parameter estimated for the “indirect” eﬀect in the short-run is a
usual DID:
γSR,2nd order = (y04−05−06T,no policy − y01−02−03T )− (y04−05−06C − y01−02−03C )
where the control group are mothers of children aged 8 to 18 years old. The specifi-
cation of the regression is the same as the baseline one described in section 5.
The parameter capturing the “direct” eﬀect in the short-run can be represented as:
γSR,1st order = [(y04−05−06T,policy − y01−02−03T )− (y04−05−06T,no policy − y01−02−03T )]
−[(y04−05−06T,no policy − y01−02−03T )− (y04−05−06C − y01−02−03C )]
I run the following regression:
yi = α+ β￿TTreated+ β￿PPost+ β￿pajePaje+ β￿PT (Post ∗ Treated)
+γSR,1st order(Post ∗ Treated ∗ Paje) + β￿xXi + ei
where the variable Post is a dummy equal to one if the observation is in the period
after the policy change (after January 2004), Treated is a dummy for mothers of
young children, Paje is a dummy equal to one if the mother is under the new system.
The triple interaction term allows me to estimate the “direct” impact of the policy
in the short-run through the parameter γSR,1st order. As explained earlier, this could
be thought of a triple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence, where the observations of two groups
cannot be diﬀerentiated in the period prior to the policy (Post ∗ Paje = Treated ∗
Paje = Post ∗ Treated ∗ Paje).
1.6.2 The long-run impact:
I estimate how the policy aﬀected the behaviour of mothers with young children once
everybody in that group was under the new policy. I basically run a DID where the
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treatment group are mothers of young children receiving the new benefits, the control
group are mothers of older children. The “pre”- period represents the years when
both types of policies were still available (2004-05-06). The “post”-period, the years
2007-08-09. This should capture the diﬀerence between the total impact of the policy
recovered in section 5 and its short-run eﬀects.
γLR = (y07−08−09T,policy − y04−05−06T,policy )− (y07−08−09C − y04−05−06C )
The regression for that DID follows the baseline specification discussed in section 5.
1.6.3 Summary of the results:
Table 1.4 reports the estimates from the regressions described above:
Age of youngest 3-11 months old 1-3 years old
Num. children 1 2 1 2
short-run: Treated
quasi-DDD estimates -.0384* .01266 -.0291*** .0012
(.0204) (.0224) (.0105) (.0114)
N 28692 28859 36182 36406
short-run: Non-Treated
DID estimates .0160 .0183 .0343* .01309
(.0323) (.0331) (.0177) (.0159)
N 26117 26593 33307 33611
long-run: Treated
DID estimates -.04759** -.0353 -.0103 .0250
(.02291) (.0222) (.0181) (.0169)
N 28042 33716 33181 38702
Table 1.4: Short-run and long-run impact on employment rates
The short-run estimates of the policy using the quasi-DDD method are very close to
what was found in section 5 using a RD method. Mothers of one child between one
and three years old did experience a strong fall in employment rates, which is likely
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due to mothers not coming back to work immediately at the end of the stay-home
subsidies period.
Overall, the “indirect” eﬀect on the placebo group of treated non-eligible mothers is
null for all groups except for mothers of one child between one to three. When not
controlling for diﬀerent trends by age groups, this estimate is essentially zero. It is
also interesting to note that the magnitude of the impact on non-eligible mothers is
nearly the opposite as that of eligible mothers. This could suggest that the mothers
leaving employment as a result of the policy were replaced by mothers not eligible to
the new policy in the short-run.
The long-run eﬀects are interesting, as they confirm what the results of section 5
suggested. For mothers of a single child younger than one, the negative impact on
employment rates of the stay-home subsidies can be equally split between an immedi-
ate fall in employment rates of around four percentage points, which is accentuated in
the long-run by an extra-fall of about five percentage points. For mothers of one child
between one and three, in the long-run the policy eventually had no more impact on
employment rates. This can be explained by the eﬀect of childcare subsidies with a
slow adjustment of the care providers’ supply causing the delay and counteracting the
negative continuation eﬀect of mothers slowly coming back to work after taking leave.
1.6.4 Robustness checks and heterogeneous impact:
For each of the regressions above, I ran a battery of specification checks similar to
the ones in section 5. For clarity, I report the results in Tables 1.17 to 1.22 in the
appendix, but summarise the main points here.
1.6.4.1 Short-run:
In the short-run the conclusions using a diﬀ-in-diﬀ framework on eligible mothers are
the same as when using a regression discontinuity design. The results for women with
one child aged one to three appear counter-intuitive at first. High educated women’s
employment fell but not that of the low educated. The employment fall was concen-
trated among mothers with a low-earning partner. The budget constraint in Figure
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1.21 illustrates how the low educated mothers living with a high-earning partner were
aﬀected by the change in income transfer thresholds. These changes created higher
incentives for them to work full-time as reflected in the budget constraint below.
This explains why once the group potentially aﬀected by the changes in that income
transfer is removed from the sample, the policy impact estimate becomes even more
negative. This evidence is then perfectly consistent with the existence of continuation
eﬀects.
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Husband working Full−time at 75th perc wage
Budget constraint: married woman, 1 kid,  1−3 y.o
Figure 1.21: Budget constraint for first-time married mother at minimum wage with
husband’s wage at 75th percentile
When analysing the behavior of non-eligible mothers in the short-run, the jump in
employment observed for mothers of a child aged between one and three is concen-
trated among the highly educated women with high earning partners, which is the
mirror of the reaction for the same group of women who were eligible to the new
system. This suggests some substitution by employers between non-eligible women
and eligible women. As eligible women take-up leave and do not immediately come
back to employment, employers substitute them with non-eligible women of the same
characteristics. This is also consistent with the sensitivity of the employment jump
for these non-eligible women to the inclusion of dummies controlling for potential
changes in age-group specific labour markets discussed above.
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1.6.4.2 Long-run:
For mothers of a child below one, in the long-run, the fall in employment rates was
concentrated among highly educated women and those with a partner in the top half
of the wage distribution. Remember that in the short-run, it was the low-educated,
low-wage partner group that responded to the policy. This implies that the policy
may have had trickle-up eﬀects. The mothers most financially aﬀected (bottom of
income distribution) take-up the program immediately, while mothers less sensitive
to financial incentives but more concerned by peers and employer reactions slowly
respond to the opportunity to take longer leave.
When the child is above one, despite the apparent absence of any impact on aggre-
gate, there appears to be a lot of variation in the response to diﬀerent components of
the policy. When decomposing further the policy impact by education and partner’s
income quartile the results appear mixed12. On the one hand, low educated women re-
sponded (very strongly) negatively when their partner had a wage in the top quartile
of the distribution. This is explained by the income eﬀect from the income trans-
fers thresholds changes, and is illustrated below in the budget constraint of Figure
1.22. On the other hand, among highly educated women, the fall in employment was
strongest when the husband was in the third quartile of the wage distribution which
is where the income transfers should have given them incentives to work full-time
and not stop work (as apparent in the budget constraint of Figure 1.23). The high-
educated women are also the ones who started taking-up the stay-home subsidies in
that period of time, suggesting that the continuation eﬀects dominated the incen-
tives to work full-time the income transfers may have created. Those highly educated
women whose husband was in the top quartile of the wage distribution ended up fac-
ing higher incentives to stop working (as shown in the budget constraint of Figure
1.24) and also decreased their employment rate. For this group of mothers the con-
tinuation eﬀects were potentially amplified by the income transfers impact on outside
work income. The women who were not susceptible to continuation eﬀects anymore
and income transfer changes (low earner partner, single) increase their employment
significantly suggesting that childcare subsidies had an impact on their decision to
work.
12I do not report them here, but they are available upon request
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Figure 1.22: Budget constraint for first-time married mother at minimum wage with
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Figure 1.24: Budget constraint for
first-time mother at 75th percentile
with husband’s earnings at 90th per-
centile wage
For mothers of two children, whose youngest is below one, the impact is similar across
all groups. When the youngest is above one, highly educated and married women
respond strongly and positively to the policy. Reassuringly, when dropping women
who were most likely to be aﬀected by the income transfer thresholds changes, the
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overall policy impact increases and becomes strongly significant, suggesting that the
childcare subsidies did have a strong positive impact on the employment of this group
of mothers.
1.6.5 Summary of the findings out of the Labour Force Surveys:
Table 1.5 below summarises the impact of the policy on each group in every time
period, and can be interpreted as follows:
• 0-1 year old, 1 child in the household: Overall a very strong negative impact
(about nine percentage points in employment rates), explained by a negative
impact in the short-run especially for poorer households and an extra negative
impact in the long-run coming from better-oﬀ households. This could be ex-
plained by first-time mothers not daring to use their right to leave work and
learning overtime how employers react. These mothers do not respond to child-
care subsidies but to the generous increase in stay-home benefits to which this
group was not eligible prior to the reform.
• 0-1 year old, 2 children in the household: Overall negative impact materialising
in the long-run (about four percentage points in employment rates). These
women were eligible to more generous childcare subsidies and faced no changes
in their incentives to stop work. The negative employment eﬀect is particularly
strong for low educated mothers with a high-earner partner. These women would
have little reason to stay attached to the labour market and may have not dared
to take-up leave previously, because of social stigma or peer pressure. We saw
that a significant number of women who just had their first child increased the
duration of their leave after birth by claiming the stay-home subsidies. This
might have also impacted women who just had a second child, to claim the
stay-home benefits.
• 1-3 years old, one child in the household: Small non-significant negative impact
overall (slightly under 2 percentage points in employment rates). A strong
negative impact in the short-run compensated by no impact of the policy in the
long-run (probably caused by the increments in childcare subsidies generosity
canceling out the continuation eﬀects of mothers who took-up leave following
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birth). The negative impact comes from mothers in couples of a child aged
between one and two13, in the same groups as those taking-up the stay-home
subsidies. This strongly suggests mothers don’t go straight back to work after
receiving the stay-home benefits. I will find evidence of it in the last section of
the paper.
• 1-3 years old, two children in the household: Significant overall positive impact
of the policy (about 4 percentage points), non-significant in the short-run but
significant in the long-run. The women most aﬀected by the increase in childcare
subsidies generosity responded most strongly.
The childcare subsidies mainly aﬀected positively mothers with children aged be-
tween one and three years old, while the stay-home benefits mainly aﬀected negatively
mothers with children younger than one year old. To try to understand better the
mechanisms behind these findings, I now use another data set with extensive infor-
mation of labour supply and childcare decisions as well as family income. This data
was collected in 2002 and 2007 specifically to evaluate the impact of the Paje policy
changes. It allows me to shed some light on the existence of continuation eﬀects, and
on changes that occurred in the childcare market.
13I ran the regressions on this demographic group splitting further into mothers with a child aged
one to two and mothers aged with a child aged two to three.
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Table 1.5: Summary of impact on employment rates
51
Chapter 1 Maternity Leave and Childcare Subsidies in France: the Paje Reform
1.7 Understanding the mechanisms using childcare
surveys:
In this section, I use the Enquetes mode de garde that were collected in 2002 and
2007. I exploit the information on type of benefits claimed, and other demograph-
ics, to understand how the benefit changes aﬀected the employment outcomes of
diﬀerent groups. The detailed information on childcare arrangements and employ-
ment status also allows me to find out if there was any crowding out in the child-
care market and how the policy impacted the mix of care modes between diﬀerent
types of households. To investigate these questions, I will follow a strategy sim-
ilar to Gruber et al (2008). I estimate Pr(Work and using caremodej) as well as
Pr(Nowork and using caremodej) (for j = subsidised private, kindergarten, other)
pre and post reform. I only have data for the years 2002 and 2007 and do not have
a control group, so can only estimate a simple diﬀerence. I find that mothers of
two children benefited the most of the childcare places that were freed thanks to the
reform.
1.7.1 Data description:
The surveys were collected by the DREES in May 2002 (before the policy change) and
November 2007 (what I call the “long-run” period, when no more households with
pre-school children were eligible for the old benefit system). Both surveys are a cross-
section of the population and interviewed (respectively) 3343 and 8177 households
with at least one child younger than seven and a half years old. Each household
was asked about their total disposable income as well as details on all the benefits
they were receiving. These surveys were designed to understand how households
used diﬀerent types of care and how this changed with the reforms of 2004. Very
specific information was collected on time spent in each mode of care during one
week. Information on gross costs as well as net costs was reported. The survey also
contains demographic variables such as the age of the parents, the date of birth of
all the children in the household, the education level of the parents. Unfortunately it
does not report any information on wages, even though it does report the employment
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status of the parents.
1.7.2 Continuation eﬀects:
I call “continuation” eﬀects the possibility of extending one’s stay outside of employ-
ment after the expiration of stay-home subsidies. Mothers do not need to have an
employment contract when they take-up the subsidy, they need to have worked eight
quarters in the last three years. In sections 5 and 6, the fall in employment rates of
mothers with one child aged one to three appeared puzzling. I mentioned that the
drop appeared to be driven mainly by mothers with a child below the age of two. This
suggests that many women did not necessarily return to work once their stay-home
subsidy had expired. The Enquete Mode de Garde asks respondents if they previously
claimed that subsidy, and when they did so, how long it took them to start work once
they were not eligible. Tables 1.6 and 7 report their answer. We observe that a much
higher proportion of women did not get back to work immediately among the mothers
of one child as opposed to the ones with two children (and stayed out of work longer).
About 13% of claimants with one child did not get back to work immediately while
the number is about 6% for mothers of two children. This confirms the existence of
“continuation” eﬀects that would explain why the employment rates of mothers whose
youngest and only child was older than one fell after the extension of the stay-home
subsidies in 2004.
Went back to work at end of subsidy
Immediately Eventually Not at all
One child .6233 .1273 .2493
Two children .6890 .0579 .2530
Table 1.6: Mothers that received the full-time “stay-home” subsidy
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Number of months
Median Mean
One child 3 6
Two children 3 4.5
Table 1.7: Time spent before returning to work if not immediately
1.7.3 Changes in the work and childcare arrangements across
demographic groups:
To understand how the childcare arrangements and work decision changed between
2002 and 2007, I first report the raw statistics in the Table 1.8 below. On aggregate,
the distribution of childcare choices has not changed a lot between 2002 and 2007. As
we saw in the previous section, more mothers entered the labour force, but as reported
in the graphs in the introduction, the number of places available in kindergarten
and through assistantes maternelles, also increased in that time period in similar
proportions. Some children might be allowed to join school as early as two years old,
but this is extremely unusual.
% Working mother Non-working mother
2002 2007 2002 2007
Assist. Mat. 32.6 31.6 2.1 2.0
Garde Dom. 1.9 2.1 0.3 0.0
Kindergarten 15.5 15.1 0.8 1.9
School 1.4 2.3 0.1 1.0
Other 48.7 48.8 96.8 95.1
Table 1.8: Main childcare modes, children aged 0 to 3 y.o
When splitting the data a little further across demographic and work-status groups
in Table 1.9, it becomes apparent that the policy was successful at freeing places
among private carers by making non-working mothers ineligible. Nevertheless, the
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increase in available places was not suﬃcient. The newly working mothers (following
the structural trend) kept using other modes of care and kindergarten, keeping the
overall distribution of childcare modes very similar to pre-2004. It appears, that
mothers with one child were crowded out in kindergarten by mothers with a second
child. This may be due to priority being explicitly given to siblings in kindergarten .
It is very likely that priority is also implicitly given by private carers to siblings.
Youngest 1-3 y.o 2 kids 1kid
2002 2007 2002 2007
Work
Private carer 17.3 22.0 26.1 29.3
Kindergart. 5.2 9.3 15.5 12.9
Other 25.1 30.2 32.8 37.8
No Work
Private carer 1.1 0.7 2.9 1.3
Kindergart. 0.2 0.9 0.4 0.9
Other 52.1 35.8 22.4 17.8
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 1.9: Proportion of mothers in each state
To check these predictions, I run a simple diﬀerence regression (unfortunately no
obvious control group exists as childcare choices mainly aﬀect mothers of pre-school
children). For each household category, I run the following regression:
Pr(Worki&Childcareij) = α+ γ￿Post+ β￿Xi + ei
where Childcareij , represents the main childcare mode j used by household i. Post
is a dummy equal to 1 if the observation was after the policy change, and Xi is a
vector of controls (education, age of the mother and its square, the age in months of
the youngest child, as well as a dummy if married and in couple). I look at three main
modes of care: private carers (assistantes maternelles and garde a domicile) that was
aﬀected by the reform, kindergarten (creches) and other. The results are presented
below in Table 1.10.
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1 kid 2 kids 1 kid 2 kids 1 kid 2 kids
Pr (Work & Private carer) Pr (Work & Kindergarten) Pr (Work & Other)
youngest 0-1 y.o -0.013 -0.027 0.003 0.019 -0.036 .0930**
(0.047) (0.033) (0.033) (0.022) (0.052) (0.041)
youngest 1-3 y.o 0.015 0.026 -.0355* .0323** .0580** .0659**
(0.025) (0.022) (0.019) (0.015) (0.027) (0.026)
Pr (No work & Private carer) Pr (No work & Kindergarten) Pr (No work & Other)
youngest 0-1 y.o 0.0054 -.0204*** -.0265** 0.007 0.067 -0.067
(0.0077) (0.0071) (0.011) (0.007) (0.047) (0.044)
youngest 1-3 y.o -.0150** 0.0054 0.008 .0103** -0.031 -.1396***
(0.0074) (0.0044) (0.005) (0.004) (0.021) (0.026)
Table 1.10: Probability of employment and childcare choices post vs pre-reform
From this exercise, we can conclude the following:
• A significant fall in the probability of using kindergarten for mothers of one
child and an increase for mothers of two children, independent of their work
situation.
• A significant fall in the probability of using private carers while not working
induced by the modification in eligibility rules to subsidies (now available ex-
clusively to working mothers).
• For mothers with a child aged one to three years old (irrespective of the number
of children), the probability of working and using other modes significantly rose.
The probability of working and using private carers rose (although the impact
is not statistically significant and bigger for mothers of two children).
• Regarding the group of mothers with two children whose youngest is one to
three, the probability of working and using kindergarten increased strongly.
Overall, more of these mothers work in 2007, they increase their use of every
possible mode of care.
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1.7.4 Summary from the childcare survey findings:
The results from section 5 and 6 strongly suggested that mothers who claimed the
leave benefit after their first birth, did not necessarily go back to work immediately
at the benefit expiration. I found clear evidence of this type of continuation eﬀects in
the childcare surveys.
The evolution of the childcare market three and a half years after the policy imple-
mentation can be summarised as follows:
• Private carers became less used by non-working mothers and more by working
mothers. This is a direct consequence of the childcare subsidies becoming con-
ditional on employment. The number of available places also generally rose,
following the pre-policy trend.
• Mothers of two children increased their use of kindergarten in general, they also
dramatically increased their participation and as a result their use of all possible
types of care.
• Working mothers of one child had to compensate the loss in places in kinder-
garten taken-up by mothers of two children. They replaced it with some of the
“freed” and new places of private carers (when these were not already taken by
mothers of two children) and other modes of care.
1.8 Conclusion:
In the period under study (the first decade of the 21st century), the employment rate
of women in France generally increased. The extension of stay-home income transfers
following a birth to mothers of one child, negatively aﬀected (directly and indirectly,
probably through peer eﬀects) the employment decision of mothers whose youngest
child was below one. This eﬀect was particularly strong in the bottom half of the
income distribution at first, and then trickled up in the long-run to mothers higher
up in the income distribution. The increase in childcare subsidies generosity, did
not aﬀect the overall distribution of childcare modes used by mothers of pre-school
children. Restricting access to subsidies to working mothers, while the total number
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of private carers kept increasing according to its pre-2004 trend, ensured that no extra
shortage of childcare would appear on aggregate. By freeing some places used by non-
working mothers and making it more aﬀordable to choose a private carer, the policy
pushed more mothers of two children where the youngest is between one and three
to work. Some of these mothers, when not working, switched from private carers
(subsidised but now conditional on working) to kindergarten (not work dependent
and priority for siblings). These two mechanisms crowded out some working mothers
with one child. These mothers could not compete with mothers of two children for
places (especially since price paid for care is bounded above and below by government
regulation, restricting price adjustments in the market and forcing the allocation of
restricted places to depend on other rules likely to be sibling priority or customer
history). When combined with continuation eﬀects, the policy ended up impacting
their employment rates negatively in the short-run but having no impact in the long-
run.
A quick back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the childcare subsidies reform
was not close to self-financing. In 2009, the total amount spent on the private carers
subsidies by the government was €4.6 Billion while the figure stood at €2.3 Billion
in 2003. Adjusting for inflation and the rising trend prior to the reform (due to an
increase in women’s participation rate in the economy), the reform probably cost
around €1.1 Billion. We saw that it increased the employment rate of mothers with
two children whose youngest is one to three by around 3.8 percentage points. In 2009,
there were about 400,000 women in this category. So the reform pushed about fifteen
thousand women to work in that group. For mothers whose only child is of the same
age, the impact of the reform on aggregate was null. But we saw that in the long-run,
some mothers increased their leave period (as a result of continuation eﬀects), while
others did join the labour market, the two eﬀects canceling out. A generous estimate
of the childcare subsidies impact on that group would be in the neighborhood of four
percentage points 14 ,this represents roughly eighteen thousand jobs. So overall the
reform pushed thirty-three thousand women to work at a “cost” of €1.1 Billion, or
14To estimate (roughly) the jobs created by the childcare subsidies in the long-run, one could argue
that continuation eﬀects decreased the employment rate by four percentage point (as in the short-
run) so that the childcare subsidy would have increased the employment rate by four percentage
points.
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an average cost per new job of €33,33315. We saw that the reform did not aﬀect the
intensive margin of work, so using the average net wage of the group, hours worked
and my tax-schedule simulation, these women’s productivity (total cost to employer)
was on average €34,000 a year . It is very likely that these women would have started
work once their youngest child started school at the age of three (the employment
rates of mothers whose youngest is older than three was not significantly aﬀected by
the reform), so the dynamic and lifetime gains in terms of human capital accumulation
are probably limited.
This paper showed that oﬀering generous maternal leave income transfers pushes
women out of employment, not only through the usual income eﬀect, but also through
peer eﬀects and continuation eﬀects (extending the time out of work once the benefits
expired). Having taken-up the leave program for the first child does not seem to im-
pact the probability of leaving work again at the birth of a second child (the absence
of such habit eﬀects could be explained by the relatively small duration of the permit-
ted leave). It also highlighted the diﬃculty of providing access to universal child care
with policy instruments such as childcare subsidies for private carers. Availability of
public childcare places as an (imperfect) substitute to private carers, and priority rules
(ether explicit or implicit) favouring households with certain characteristics (such as
number of siblings), can lead to crowding-out even among working mothers. As a
result, childcare subsidies to private carers may not be the most cost-eﬀective way to
push mothers’ employment rates up. Further research on the eﬀectiveness of other
modes of care such as public kindergarten and early-age school would be welcome.
In the next chapter I develop a structural labour supply model for married women. I
will use the reduced-form estimates of the policy impact to check the validity of the
estimated model. This will also allow me to separately disentangle the eﬀect of each
policy change.
15This might be might an upper-bound as I did not look at the impact on households with three
children and more who represent about a fifth of households with pre-school children. The reform
also impacted households whose youngest is three to six years old who could claim these childcare
subsidies. But this latter group did not respond to the reform. In 2003, 260 thousand children
aged three to six were receiving the subsidies, and 278 thousand in 2009 according to DREES.
These numbers for pre-school age children are respectively 512 thousand and 586 thousand.
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Appendix:
Labour Supply of mothers with two (youngest below one)
children, and one child aged one to three:
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Figure 1.25: Employment rates for
mothers of two children (youngest
under one year old)
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Figure 1.26: Employment rates for
mothers of a first child (one to three
years old)
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Figure 1.27: Working hours for
mothers of of two children (youngest
under one year old)
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Figure 1.28: Working hours for
mothers of a first child (one to three
years old)
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The Income Transfers (Allocation de base) eﬀect on work
incentives for mothers:
The increase in the eligibility thresholds to income transfers aﬀected the budget con-
straints of mothers with one or two children diﬀerently. Eﬀectively, this income trans-
fer cannot be claimed at the same time as the Stay-home benefits. When mothers
are not receiving the Stay-home benefits, they may claim the income transfer if the
household income is below certain thresholds. The increase in eligibility thresholds
would have had little impact on single mothers budget constraints (their income being
most of the time already below the threshold pre-reform). By increasing the eligibility
thresholds, mothers in couples with one child aged one to three might have seen their
budget constraints shift out (depending on their partner’s income and their wage) at
certain hours of work. The incentives to work aﬀected mainly women with one child
in the third quartile of the income distribution. Figures 1.29 to 1.32 give examples of
the changes in incentives faced by some of these women.
Turning our attention to mothers of two children, for the women who became eligible
to that Allocation de base, when combined with the stay-home benefits to work part-
time (that are non-means tested), the budget constraint may have shifted out above 28
hours of work a week (as illustrated in the third budget constraint below), resulting in
higher incentives to work full-time. This could aﬀect only mothers with two children.It
is hard to draw a clear prediction as to how the incentives changed in general for
mothers who would have been aﬀected by these thresholds increases to the Allocation
de base. To control for its potential impact on my estimation of the childcare subsidies
impact, I re-run my regressions, getting rid of women whose partner’s income is in
between the old and new thresholds (this is an imperfect check as it assumes partner’s
labour supply is fixed). I also estimate my regressions separately for households in
the bottom-half and top half of the income distribution. As mentioned earlier, this
modification in the tax schedule aﬀected mainly households in the top half of the
income distribution, and potentially more significantly women with one child aged one
to three years old. As mentioned in section 3 though, the share of eligible households
to that income transfer rose by 15 percentage points as a result of the changes (which
is not an incredibly high number). I also check in the second chapter with a structural
model what was the likely overall eﬀect of these specific changes and will find them
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to be small and positive.
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Figure 1.29: Married mother of one
child at minimum wage, husband at
median wage
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Figure 1.30: Married mother of one
child at median wage, husband at
median wage
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Figure 1.31: Married mother of one
child at median wage, husband at
75th perc. wage
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Figure 1.32: Married mother of one
child at 75th perc. wage, husband
at 75th perc. wage
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Figure 1.34: Married mother of two
children at median wage, husband at
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Figure 1.35: Married mother of two
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Summary Tables of the reform:
Old System (APE) New System (PAJE)
ELIGIBILITY Youngest kid born before 1st Jan.
2004
Youngest kid born after 1st Jan 2004
TRANSFERS APJE: Same as Allocation de base,
but the eligibility thresholds are much
lower.
Allocation de.base: 171 €/ month
during first three years of kid
(means-tested). The increase in
the eligibility thresholds
augmented the number of eligible
families by 15 p.pts.
BENEFITS APE: If mother decreases hours
worked or stops work, she receives a
monthly benefit. Needs to have two or
three kids to claim it. Big disincentive
to work (cf.Piketty). Not means-tested
CLCA: If mother decreases hours
worked or stops work, receives a
monthly benefit of 305,404,531€ (if she
does not receive the “Allocation de
base”, if she does than 171 Euros are
deducted from these transfers). The
part-time payment is 15% higher
than APE. Mothers of first kid
can now claim it for 6 months
after maternity leave (so within first
10 months of the kid). Conditions
on past work experience more
stringent than APE.Not
means-tested
Table 1.11: Summary of changes to the tax-benefit system
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Old System (APE) New System (PAJE)
ELIGIBILITY Youngest kid born before 1st Jan.
2004
Youngest kid born after 1st Jan 2004
CHILDCARE
Government pays employment
contributions
Government pays employment
contributions
Benefit to pay employee up to a cap
(income-tested)
More generous benefit up to a cap
Household pays min. of 15% of
employee salary
Household pays min. of 15% of
employee salary
Not work-dependent Need to work to claim it
If both parents work,remaining
childcare costs used for tax deductions
If both parents work, remaining
childcare costs used for tax deductions
Covers home-care costs less generously
than assistante maternelle (only 50%
of contributions & no benefit)
Covers home-care costs less generously
than assistante maternelle (only 50%
of contributions) but can now claim
benefit to pay salary of employee
like for assistante maternelle
Table 1.12: Summary of the changes to the childcare subsidies system
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Specification checks of Section 4:
Age of youngest 3-11 months old 1-3 years old
Num. children 1 2 1 2
Part I:
Cluster s.e -.0424578525 -.0303342417 -.0409001186*** -.0029067912
(.0308821741) (.0218149107) (.0123729948) (.014306929)
year dummies -.0249169618 -.0215853285 -.0411203764*** .013365102
(.0308721364) (.0336059853) (.0156614874) (.0172790568)
control EE -.0266440753 .0008959887 -.0379883796*** -.0031759904
(.0268720426) (.0293544233) (.0140095865) (.0153155522)
high edu -.0413259715 -.0111454055 -.0567795783*** .0194431767
(.0270744506) (.0342540666) (.0160816349) (.020019196)
low edu -.0767136514* -.0479708128 -.0032357967 -.0165729355
(.046350725) (.0384840816) (.0277340785) (.0243940875)
married -.0307956431 -.0633210167** -.0384971499** .0144212199
(.0331806876) (.0322232991) (.0190079696) (.0188794732)
single .0342286304 .1079500914 -.0440552756 .0375350714
(.0945982859) (.102373749) (.0432926454) (.0494544655)
unemployment rates -.0411480404* -.0308364015 -.043303635*** -.005198549
(.0233938619) (.0254895203) (.0138716912) (.0150888385)
drop Alloc. base -.0290980209 -.0424482301 -.0467999466*** -.0040832642
(.0249681119) (.0264947601) (.0149387913) (.0158765167)
region dummies -.044092834* -.0330117941 -.0423858687*** -.0015621308
(.0237684473) (.0256614946) (.0140168006) (.0152474046)
nannies wage variation -.0456363522* -.0263553727 -.0407813862*** -.0024115075
(.0233939514) (.0255052969) (.0139613338) (.0152465906)
partner in bottom half wage distr. -.0527689829 -.0696946904* -.0626612082*** -.0368989334
(.0340792201) (.0372598916) (.0208888277) (.0231007375)
partner in top half wage distr. -.0285259318 .0045309463 -.0223561917 .0172449574
(.0323070996) (.0346849747) (.0185379405) (.0201735478)
Table 1.13: Regression discontinuity specification checks, Part I
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Age of youngest 3-11 months old 1-3 years old
Num. children 1 2 1 2
Part II: diﬀerent windows
8 qu. Window -.0255080294 -.0053196293 -.0408610813** .0241873134
(.0291686263) (.0319054574) (.0171640497) (.0185371991)
N 3781 3399 9945 9592
16 qu. Window -.0336858891* -.0355489589 -.0222025067* -.00562956
(.0201517176) (.0219363887) (.0123528829) (.0132838432)
N 7114 3781 18624 17936
Table 1.14: Regression discontinuity specification checks , Part II
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Age of youngest 3-11 months old 1-3 years old
Num. children 1 2 1 2
Part I:
Cluster s.e -.0897979289** -.0429497696** -.0088387756 .0270545632
(.0323958062) (.0175959822) (.0183531791) (.0159447044)
year dummies -.0896969363*** -.0434613265* -.0089754239 .0270809159*
(.0243154783) (.0222062729) (.0166640654) (.0145359868)
control EE -.0897428766*** -.0435026027* -.008637324 .0266909935*
(.0243216474) (.0222051423) (.0166616347) (.0145335356)
high edu -.1316915303*** -.0366569832 -.0161552317 .0579622686***
(.0312805995) (.0309228618) (.022503376) (.0198191479)
low edu -.1209774837*** -.0976190493*** -.0275210254 -.0630510673***
(.0455477163) (.0365294106) (.0278576855) (.0228952859)
married -.0910101458*** -.0487664677* -.0381856449* .0392436907**
(.0343638025) (.026929047) (.0225684047) (.0170880053)
single -.0065021478 -.0976461992 -.0817979649** -.0844488814*
(.063991785) (.0721115619) (.0363512076) (.0442342237)
unemployment rates -.0934214443*** -.046115648** -.0136317443 .0241474323*
(.0243348107) (.0221968573) (.0165939406) (.0144844968)
drop Alloc. base -.0912028477*** -.0468402691** -.0083684893 .0217081681
(.026870247) (.0232173596) (.0187421087) (.0151355118)
region dummies -.0901270062*** -.050546404** -.0064244824 .0261147246*
(.0243748222) (.022361096) (.0166120864) (.0145894364)
nannies wage variation -.0923328847*** -.0409842245* -.0092192944 .0279803649*
(.0243342817) (.0222835653) (.0167123247) (.014578227)
partner in bottom half wage distr. -.1087860018*** -.0178518407 -.0177919306 -.0175845027
(.0355001315) (.0312960409) (.0238256566) (.0210535955)
partner in top half wage distr. -.0723659024** -.0708088279** .0019735941 .0601688512***
(.0336259007) (.0316638015) (.0233741235) (.0201328024)
Table 1.15: DiD baseline specification checks, Part I
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Table 1.16: DiD baseline specification checks, Part II & III
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Specification checks of Section 5:
Age of youngest 3-11 months old 1-3 years old
Num. children 1 2 1 2
Part I:
Cluster s.e -.0384356156*** .0126688965 -.0291037075** .0012679729
(.011834316) (.0285740234) (.0102055511) (.0111967484)
year dummies -.0359700471* .0073424634 -.0304927155*** .0063860673
(.0215472039) (.0237442851) (.0117886467) (.0124131059)
control EE -.036546614* .0153317768 -.0279844273*** .0127274869
(.0205152035) (.0224797092) (.010551597) (.0120806005)
high edu -.0210764501 .0368198007 -.0405050144*** .021591343
(.0236891434) (.0302468147) (.0123347593) (.0150280772)
low edu -.096760489** -.0236759204 -.013671075 -.0237798803
(.0404794477) (.0327037089) (.0204198658) (.0177509189)
married -.0345107093 .0095833419 -.0424107052*** .0176868904
(.0287851337) (.0286242086) (.0143178813) (.0141645316)
single -.0482309423 .1405691504* -.053584855 -.0721592158*
(.0787093341) (.0785910562) (.0349927731) (.0378751867)
unemployment rates -.0419100747** .0077787559 -.0312416069*** .0009039417
(.0205833931) (.0224935468) (.010530103) (.011361246)
drop Alloc. base -.0324499309 .0046836343 -.031510666*** -.0325795375***
(.0217426084) (.0232709218) (.0109934574) (.0118323723)
region dummies -.0442235842** .0127146896 -.030127652*** -.0023841639
(.020729389) (.0220330693) (.0106047401) (.0113913678)
nannies wage variation -.0407964066** .0157064255 -.0270424262** .0013172298
(.0204734094) (.0225315057) (.0105726533) (.0114708338)
partner in bottom half wage distr. -.0609722398** .0041591409 -.0424822085*** -.0283068717*
(.029449515) (.0320735015) (.0153008932) (.016847901)
partner in top half wage distr. -.0197105817 .0189567376 -.017855335 .023933934
(.0287261903) (.0315520652) (.0145254042) (.0155051816)
Table 1.17: Short-Run Treated quasi-DDD specification checks, Part I
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Table 1.18: Short-Run Treated quasi-DDD specification check, Part II
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Age of youngest 3-11 months old 1-3 years old
Num. children 1 2 1 2
Part I:
Cluster s.e .0160975046 .0183340516 .0343257748 .0130905127
(.0358458385) (.0298840087) (.0215135198) (.0178906471)
year dummies .0155019984 .016532287 .0349333733** .0122858174
(.0327310525) (.0334732533) (.0178224985) (.0159963518)
control EE .0141387377 .0151622808 .0340747572* .0124205668
(.0323738381) (.0331219807) (.0177431963) (.0159114674)
high edu .054257188 -.0333908238 .0664571747*** -.0071114944
(.0410191007) (.0454612449) (.0247715041) (.0225806404)
low edu .0138154691 .0398601629 .0385904238 .0225006826
(.0629293695) (.0530995354) (.028336307) (.0235389024)
married .0456768945 -.0087557174 .0377134271 -.0113351578
(.0462165847) (.040546719) (.0238166805) (.0187913459)
single -.0003765976 -.0478874706 .0746692*** .0433338173
(.1280602515) (.1027058437) (.215135) (.0485743396)
unemployment rates -.036138 .0163047779 .0311792772* .0118970117
(.0242411) (.0347337574) (.0177212339) (.0158289056)
drop Alloc. base -.0370173 -.0223876 .0343257748* .0130905127
(.0265871) (.0244638) (.017746048) (.0159013551)
region dummies .0292896423 -.0082204 .0343794636* .0130825527
(.0330591649) (.0230637) (.017763067) (.0158534665)
nannies wage variation .0162677597 .0170271844 .0344753116* .0132426247
(.0323788486) (.0332768969) (.0177860335) (.0159430187)
partner in bottom half wage distr. -.0682215542 .057229884 -.0018821525 .0067773764
(.0462523997) (.0481780171) (.0248461999) (.0232064966)
partner in top half wage distr. .1094086766** -.026313806 .1669263989 .0134619437
(.0458322465) (.0465356186) (.1150180995) (.0219835788)
Table 1.19: Short-Run Non-Treated DiD specification checks, Part I
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Table 1.20: Short-Run Non-Treated DiD specification checks, Part II & III
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Age of youngest 3-11 months old 1-3 years old
Num. children 1 2 1 2
Part I:
Cluster s.e -.0475914292** -.0353182815** -.0103534805 .025030097*
(.0226303153) (.0168370008) (.0169892088) (.0132849617)
year dummies -.0480260439** -.0352034271 -.0120491767 .0218358357
(.0229844656) (.0223070551) (.018541541) (.0156161916)
control EE -.0475914292** -.0353182815 -.0103534805 .025030097
(.0229102504) (.0222811401) (.0181147326) (.0169207435)
high edu -.1030652449*** -.0176278595 -.0413559191* .0730443522***
(.0298303906) (.0301449765) (.0241765268) (.022856582)
low edu -.0637916103 -.0568043478 -.0231541153 -.0276219752
(.04291391) (.0366685018) (.0321008973) (.0273488294)
married -.0528208688 -.0176377837 -.0446590707* .0493050553**
(.0327396318) (.0270770267) (.0251271892) (.0205506962)
single .0109671913 -.1271184* -.03650041* -.0226997
(.0588885918) (.712968) (.0205322) (.218688)
unemployment rates -.0481547303** -.0376609042* -.0091474429 .0220243894
(.0228706058) (.0222497471) (.0180635434) (.0168416668)
drop Alloc. base -.0507907122** -.0222239364 -.0070754346 .0358179435**
(.024272332) (.0238755923) (.0194802526) (.0180793237)
region dummies -.040994253* -.0432690606* -.0037899541 .0260348935
(.0229840949) (.022214083) (.0181374233) (.0167745594)
nannies wage variation -.0502670221** -.0366564617 -.0122849075 .029862294*
(.022924101) (.0223454311) (.018126348) (.0170029625)
partner in bottom half wage distr. -.0253691152 -.0419392064 .0278151613 .026654182
(.0319309458) (.0316905268) (.0251860674) (.0255386624)
partner in top half wage distr. -.0800842047** -.0307411496 -.0542844422** .0350797214
(.0330120027) (.0319353007) (.0263157263) (.0227906629)
Table 1.21: Long-Run Treated DiD specification checks
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Table 1.22: Long-Run Treated DiD specification checks
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Habit eﬀects, regressions estimates:
Age of youngest Method All High education Low education
3-11 months old Regression discontinuity: -.0054070498 -.0228483062 .0265412368
(.0484123901) (.0620891526) (.0651458949)
Diﬀerence: -.0084998105 -.0006912955 -.0284995586
(.012907153) (.0163916852) (.0174583085)
1-3 year old Regression discontinuity: -.0305294301 .0152711291 -.0447930358
(.0388000719) (.0336264782) (.053495571)
Diﬀerence: -.0053118682 -.0134688588 .0077692638
(.0117106549) (.019251531) (.0171445757)
Note: standard errors clustered at birth date of first child for RD, and interview date for
Diﬀerence specification. All regressions include the same control variables as in the baseline
specification discussed in section 5.1 .
Table 1.23: Employment rates diﬀerences of mothers with two kids depending on
the birth of the first
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2 Labour supply of French married
women, a structural approach.
2.1 Overview
In this chapter, I develop and estimate a static labour supply model with part-time
and full-time wage equations as well as demand-side constraints. This allows me to
understand to what extent the assumption of a unique hourly productivity and the
absence of any diﬃculties to find work may aﬀect the elasticities estimates and the
predictions from tax reform simulations.
2.2 Introduction:
In this chapter, I develop a static labour supply model that will also be used in the
third chapter and applied to British data. I focus exclusively on married women with
working husbands for reasons discussed further down. I will use the availability of a
very clear and large policy change (the availability of stay-home subsidies to mothers
of a first child) to check the validity of diﬀerent specifications of the model. Indeed,
to depart from many papers, I will estimate a model with part-time and full-time
wage equations as well as demand-side constraints. This allows me to understand to
what extent the assumption of a unique hourly productivity and the absence of any
diﬃculties to find work may aﬀect the elasticities estimates and the predictions from
tax reform simulations.
The model in this chapter builds on the work by Blundell et al (1999) to specify the
supply side, and the work of Laroque and Salanie (2002) and Blundell et al (1987) re-
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garding the demand-side. Many labour supply studies have used diﬀerent approaches
to account for involuntary unemployment. Blundell et al (1987) introduce an index
function, depending on a variety of macroeconomic and microeconomic factors, that
determines whether an individual who wishes to work is in employment, this results in
a double-hurdle model. Focusing on lone mothers, Bingley and Walker (1997) combine
a discrete-choice multinomial probit model with a latent model for the probability of
involuntary unemployment. They use the survey information on desired hours worked
to discriminate between voluntary non-participation and involuntary unemployment.
Duncan and McCrae (1999) follow a similar strategy using a conditional logit frame-
work, but also diﬀerentiate the unemployed seekers from the discouraged workers.
More recently, Bargain et al (2010) extend the Duncan and MacCrae (1999) approach
by allowing unemployment to be involuntary for both members of the household and
by using the desired hours of unemployed workers and not just the fact that they
wish to work. On French data, Laroque and Salanie (2002) disentangle the minimum
wage barrier (called “classical unemployment”) from unemployment resulting from
frictions and/or business cycles (called “other unemployment”). The specification I
pursue follows that “other unemployment” modeling technique. It is also worth men-
tioning that all the above papers with the exception of Laroque and Salanie (2002)
estimate a unique wage equation in a first-step.
The results show that accounting for part-time wage penalties does not really af-
fect the elasticities estimates and the predicted reaction to fiscal reforms. Explicitly
accounting for potential rationing on the labour market diminishes the size of the
elasticities and more realistically predicts the eﬀects of large tax and benefit reforms.
Due to data limitations, I cannot model the changes in childcare prices pre and post
reforms. I can predict the impact of each of the other policy component. The reform
simulation from the model confirm the main conclusions from Chapter 1. The large
fall in employment rates for mothers of a first child is entirely due to the extension
of stay-home subsidies, the fall in employment for mothers with two children whose
youngest is below one cannot be explained by any changes in the work incentives they
faced. For mothers of two children whose youngest is one to three, the income transfer
threshold changes and change in part-time work transfers had a rather limited impact
on their labour supply. A large share of their employment rate increase observed in
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the first chapter should therefore be attributed to the childcare subsidies.
Section 3 presents the model specification, section 4 discusses the data used and
estimation results, while section 5 uses the model to evaluate the reform and compare
the predictions from the results from a Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences similar to the one
presented in the first chapter.
2.3 A model of Labour Supply:
In this section I describe the static labour supply model I estimate on French data
here (and on UK data in the next chapter). This model builds on the work by Blundell
et al (1999) and Laroque and Salanie (2002).
Modeling the couple’s joint labour supply decision would be a huge challenge in France
as married couples pay taxes jointly1. As a result, I assume that each woman i, takes
her husband’s labour supply as given. She chooses the hours of work that maximise
her utility derived from household consumption C and her hours worked H:
max
Hi,Ci
U(Hi,Ci)
Her choice set is discrete, and she chooses her hours of workHi such thatH
j
i ￿{0, 20, 30, 35}.
The labour market is assumed to be competitive and an individual is paid her pro-
ductivity. At each hour choice Hji , she is paid a gross hourly wage W ji that depends
on her productive observable and unobservable characteristics:
ln (W ji ) = γjZi + σjεi
Her productive characteristics Zi are education, age and its square. Apart from age,
the variables aﬀecting productivity are not aﬀecting one’s preferences. The unobserv-
able characteristic εi is drawn from a standard Normal distribution. To control for
1Also, the majority of non-employed husbands are unemployed and it is impossible with the infor-
mation in the data to infer the unemployment benefits they receive. In France the unemployment
benefit system is based on replacement rates that vary with the duration of the unemployment
spell.
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a possible part-time wage penalty, the returns to these characteristics (γj and σj)
and the constant terms contained in γj diﬀer at each hour choice. This specifica-
tion controls for the fact that the jobs available part-time are likely to diﬀer from
the jobs oﬀered full-time, but that a worker’s characteristics (observables as well as
unobservables) stay the same.
When making her decision, the woman is facing a household budget set defined in
terms of the gross wage rates she is oﬀered, her husband’s earnings and the tax system.
The household consumption is Y ji = R(W ji Hji ,WhusbandHhusband, Xi),where R is the
tax and benefits system function, which may also vary with some of the household
characteristics Xi (such as number of kids). In this simple specification, the household
consumption in each state is: Cji = Y ji .
The utility function is a quadratic function of consumption and hours worked:
U(Hji ,C
j
i ,Xi)
= βyiCji + βhiHji + αy(Cji )2 + αh(Hji )2 + αyhCjiHj
Observed heterogeneity is introduced linearly through parameters βy and βh:
βyi = β0y + β1yXi
βhi = β0h + β1hXi
The observable characteristics Xi include the number of kids and dummy variables
controlling for the age of youngest child, the woman’s age and its square, a dummy if
the woman left school before the age of 16, and a dummy if living in Paris. Education
generally does not aﬀect preferences. If one has not completed school until the age of
sixteen, this may reveal particular tastes, otherwise, any extra year of education only
aﬀects a woman’s productivity. The fertility decision here is not modeled. Women
have kids exogenously. Children aﬀect the woman’s taste for leisure, but not her
productivity.
To allow for state-specific errors in perception, random disturbances νj assumed to
be independently distributed as a Type I extreme value, are added to utilities in each
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labour market state. The utility derived from each alternative is then:
U∗(Hji ,Cji ,Xi)
= U(Hji ,Cji ,Xi) + ν
j
i
And the probability of choosing the labour market state j, can be defined as a logit:
Pr(Hi = Hji ) = Pr(U∗(Hji ,Cji ,Xi) > U
∗
(Hki ,Cki ,Xi)
, for all j ￿= k)
=
exp[U∗(Hji ,Cji )]￿ exp[
k
U∗(Hki ,Cki )
]
It is important to note that the IIA property holds in this specification. A common
way to relax the assumption is to introduce random heterogeneity in the utility func-
tion coeﬃcients, but Haan (2006) has shown that the estimates obtained in either
specification do not diﬀer significantly2.
2.3.1 Accounting for unobserved wages and selection bias:
Unfortunately, the wages of women not working in the data are not observed. The
unobserved productive characteristic of the woman should have an impact on her
decision to participate in the labour market. The distribution of unobservables for
workers in the sample is not the same as the one for non-workers, and to recover the
population distribution (and not simply the distribution conditional on working) it is
important to account for a potential selection bias. I will follow the specification of
Laroque and Salanie (2002) and Laroque (2005). The disturbance εi is allowed to be
correlated with the utility of not working. The utility at zero hours of work becomes:
U(0,C0i ,Xi) = βyiC
0
i + αy(C0i )2 + ρεi
This unobserved ability does not aﬀect her choice of hours of work, but only her choice
to participate or not. In a discrete choice model, one identifies only the diﬀerences
in utility. When looking at the diﬀerence in utility between working j hours and not
2I have checked that this was still holding in a simplified version of the model where the wage
equation was estimated in a first-step and rely on these observations
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working : U∗(Hji ,Cji ,Xi) − U
∗
(H0,C0i ,Xi)
= U(Hj ,Cji ,Xi) + ν
j − U(0,C0i ,Xi) + ν0i , a higher ρεi
would increase that diﬀerence. So the probability of choosing not to work, defined
as: Pr(U(0,C0i ,Xi)−U(Hji ,Cji ,Xi) > ν
j
i − ν0i ) increases as ρεi rises, holding everything else
constant. On the other hand, the choice between j hours and k > 0 hours does not
directly depend on that unobserved ability εi. If the correlation ρ is negative, women
with higher unobserved ability have a higher preference for work, and are less likely
to be observed not working. A positive correlation could be interpreted as the most
productive women being more reluctant to participate in the labour market.
I do not model the possibility of measurement error in wages. Van Soest et al (2002),
explicitly separate the unobserved part of the wage equation into an unobserved ability
residual and an unobserved measurement error residual that does not enter the Labour
Supply decision. They find that the measurement error in wage rates account for most
of the unobserved part of the hourly wage. This measurement error residual, they
argue, could be interpreted more generally as the part of the hourly wage rate which
is job or hours specific. By estimating three wage equations instead of one, I should
minimise its impact.
2.3.2 Accounting for Costs of Work:
The model presented above is too simplistic, in that the only disincentive to work
comes from the loss of leisure time. Working also has a monetary cost. It can be de-
composed into a fixed cost (the price of transport fares to go to the oﬃce for instance)
and a variable cost in the presence of childcare (if every hour worked increases the
hours of childcare usage).
2.3.2.1 Fixed costs of work:
I add fixed costs of work to the model in the following way. I introduce a fixed cost
of work expression for part-time and full-time workers that varies with the number of
children and the age of the youngest child, if the woman lives in Paris, and a constant.
I also add another constant fixed cost of work for full-time workers
FCi = X ￿i,FCθ1[Hji > 0] + θft1[Hji = 35]
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As Heim and Meyer (2004) note, costs of work are identified in these type of labour
supply structural models only through strong functional form assumptions. They are
supposed to capture the pecuniary costs of working, but may also reflect other benefits
or utility costs.
2.3.2.2 Childcare prices:
To account for child-care expenditures, I follow a similar strategy to Blundell et al
(2000). I define household groups according to their net observed total income. I
then estimate a discrete distribution (6 points) of hourly costs pc for each group. It
is important to note that due to data limitation these are net hourly costs in France.
In France, the price of childcare depends on the town you live in and also on your
household income.
I assume a linear deterministic relationship of hours of work on hours of childcare
used for each household group and estimate the following specification:
hcc = α+ αhh
For each woman, at each working hours choice (20 hours, 30 hours, Full-time), I
determine the predicted hours of childcare per child: hjcc. I then multiply this by each
pc point to obtain childcare costs:
CCHj = hjccpc
and integrate out the pc distribution in the likelihood.
Household income at each childcare hourly cost becomes:
Cj
Hji ,pc
= R(W ji Hj,WhusbandHhusband, Xi)− FCi − CCHj
This approach does have shortcomings, especially that it does not model for the choice
of childcare usage, trying to add this to the already complicated model and with the
information available in the data seems extremely challenging. Another shortcoming
is that it does not account for the presence of relatives such as grand-parents. But in
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my sample I only consider households with one family unit and no other dependent
except children. To control for the availability of family relatives for childcare on
French data, Chone et al (2004) introduced in the child-care expenditure equation a
dummy equal to 1 if the wife lives in the department where she is born. This dummy
was found to be not significant, and it may not be the case that the grand-parents
still live in the same department anyway, so I don’t pursue this idea.
2.3.3 Labour demand constraints.
So far the model implies that women choose their optimal hours of work and can find
a job. This assumption seems particularly unrealistic in the French labour market.
To control for the possibility of constraints in the demand for labour, I assume that
women have a probability of finding work (as in Laroque and Salanie (2002)), should
they choose to participate in the labour market. This probability depends on a vector
of characteristics Ji : the age of the individual, the local unemployment rate and
a constant. Laroque and Salanie (2002) specify an exponential function bounded
between 0 and 1. I follow the double-hurdle specification of Blundell et al (1987) and
consider a Normal distribution instead:
Pr (Findwork) = Φ(ζJi)
This is a reduced-form specification and does not intend to capture any structural
explanation as to why such constraints are observed.
2.3.4 The likelihood function:
The model specification considers a woman knows her productivity, the wages she
would be paid, and the household net revenue at each of her available hours choice.
She decides what hours maximise her utility. She then gets on the labour market and
may find a job or may not. This specification is similar to Blundell et al (1987), but
diﬀers from Laroque and Salanie (2002). In this latter model, a woman may not be
able to find a full-time job, but could prefer working part-time than not at all.
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The likelihood contribution of a woman observed working can then be written as:
li = log
￿
pc
￿
j
Prob(Hi = Hji |Zi, pc, εi)1(Hi=H
j
i )Pr(Findwork)Pr(pc)Pr(εi)
The wages of a woman observed not working need to be inferred and her likelihood
contribution integrated over the distribution of ε, is given by:
li = log
ˆ
ε
￿
pc
￿
j
{Prob(Hi = 0|Zi, pc, εi)+[1−Prob(Hi = 0|Zi, pc, εi)]Pr(Findwork)}Pr(pc) f(ε) dε
The integrals in the log-likelihood are approximated using simulation methods.
2.3.5 Identification:
The identification of these types of labour supply models has been widely discussed
in the literature. To ensure that the identification of the model does not rest solely
on the parametric specifications, some exclusion restrictions need to be imposed.
The woman’s productivity enters the work decision only through its eﬀect on the net
disposable income when she works. The husband’s wages enter the work decision
through the income outside work (and also through the income should she work).
So variation in husband wages as well as women’s wages, combined with the non-
linearities and dependance of the tax-schedule on certain household characteristics
(such as number of children or location) should ensure enough variation in the income
variable to identify its impact on labour supply choices. To identify the parameters
of the utility function, variables presumably aﬀecting exclusively the demand-side of
the labour market (education and unemployment rate) do not influence the utility
function. In addition, work preferences may vary with certain taste shifters (number
and age of children), independently of the productivity characteristics. As mentioned
earlier, the fixed costs of work parameters can be identified only through the strong
functional form assumptions made.
To ensure I can identify the parameters of the employment probability function, I
restrict a continuous variable (the local unemployment rate variable) to enter only
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in Pr (Findwork), while education enters only the wages. Women who have very
productive characteristics (long studies say) and strong tastes for work characteristics
(young without children for instance), but are still observed not working would ensure
identifiability of these parameters.
2.4 Data and estimation results :
2.4.1 Data:
I use the French Labour Force Survey (Enquete Emploi en Continu) 2007. In the
sample under study, I focus on married households where the wife is between 25 and
50 years old, where neither the head nor the wife is studying, self-employed, retired,
a member in the forces or seriously disabled. I drop women working as teachers or
professors as they are likely to report working Part-time when in reality they work
Full-time but don’t account for the preparation work done at home. I also drop
observations with unrealistically low wages, or reporting paid work but no earnings.
I consider households where the husband is observed working. In France, most of
the non-working husbands are unemployed and I do not have enough information in
the survey to model properly their unemployment benefits and therefore realistically
model their labour supply choices.
To recover the childcare price distribution and hours of childcare usage per hours
worked I use the survey collected by the Drees in 2007 “Mode de garde et d’accueil
des jeunes enfants” that I already used in the first chapter. A representative sample
of 8,177 households with children below the age of seven and a half were interviewed,
and asked questions about all the types of childcare used, the hours and price of each
type of childcare and other demographic characteristics. They were also asked about
the childcare subsidies they receive. I do not diﬀerentiate among types of childcare
used, and consider the average net hourly price of childcare paid per child. Most
households tend to use one type of paying childcare. This net price of childcare will
be correlated with the household’s earnings and to control for that I will separate the
population according to net observed household income. Implicitly, I am assuming
that in France when a mother decides how much to work, she will take the net hourly
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price of childcare as given and will not account for the potential change due to diﬀerent
household resources following a change in her labour supply. This assumption seems
hard to avoid due to data limitation, but may not be too critical. As I showed in
the first chapter, the subsidies to private carers resemble a lump-sum reimbursement
of costs, where the generosity of that lump-sum transfer varies only according to two
income thresholds.
The results of the childcare regressions and details on the distribution of prices are
reported in the appendix. I am grateful to Guy Laroque who let me use the routines
he wrote for the French tax system in the early 2000’s, I have updated and modified
these routines to match the 2007 French tax system.
2.4.2 Estimates:
The parameter estimates are presented in the appendix. Regarding the utility func-
tions, across all three specifications, the marginal utility of income is positive, living
in Paris increases the marginal utility of income, while having left school before the
age of sixteen decreases it. The marginal utility of hours worked is negative and
strongly significant across all three specifications, it decreases with the number of
children, and increases in Paris. The only parameter that appears aﬀected by the
diﬀerent specifications is the correlation term controlling for selection. It is negative
and significant when I do not account for demand constraints (suggesting that more
productive women are more likely to be employed everything else constant). This goes
against the usual predictions and results where more productive women have higher
reservation wages (their time is worth more to them) and are hence less likely to be
observed working. Once I control for demand constraints, the sign of the parameter
becomes positive (and non-significant). This suggests, that the demand-side con-
straints are strong and are captured by the selection mechanism when not explicitly
accounted for.
The fixed costs of work parameters are very similar in the diﬀerent specifications.
The constants are negative, suggesting that the benefits of being employed surpass
its costs (this could reflect human capital accumulation benefits, or pension savings).
As expected, living in Paris and having young children is associated with a positive
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cost. Note that the cost is very small for children aged three to six, which should
reflect the possibility of leaving them all day at school. Finally having more children
brings benefits to working (and not costs). This result is counter-intuitive, and might
reflect the idea that mothers still have an incentive to stay in the labour force for
career prospects for instance.
Regarding the employment constraints, local unemployment has a significant negative
impact on the probability of finding work, while older women have higher chances of
being successful in their job hunt.
In the wage equations, the inclusion of demand constraints hardly influences the pa-
rameter estimates. The estimates reflect exactly what economic theory would predict
(positive and diminishing eﬀect of age, and positive returns to education). The pa-
rameter estimates of the wage equation in the one-wage model are very close to the
Full-time wage equation ones in the three-wages model (which is sensible as the ma-
jority of working women are employed full-time). The diﬀerence in returns to lower
education attainments between part-time and full-time work are sizable.
Table 2.9 in the appendix shows the full model with demand constraints and part-time
wages fits best the data.
2.4.3 Elasticities
The wage elasticities presented in Table 2.1 decrease slightly by accounting for part-
time wage diﬀerentials (especially for mothers of young children and low educated
women) and a little more when accounting for demand constraints. Overall controlling
for potential rationing decreases the elasticities by about 10% which is similar to the
results of Bargain et al (2010). Demand constraints aﬀect particularly the elasticities
of women without children or highly educated, as these women are most likely to
be willing to work and therefore aﬀected by constraints to find work. I also recover
the income elasticities by simulating the response to a 1% increase in outside of
work income. Table 2.2 reports the income elasticities that decrease slightly with the
presence of demand constraints.
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Model No Part-Time Wages No Demand Constraints Demand Constraints
Elasticities Intensive Participation Intensive Participation Intensive Participation
All .50 .42 .49 .41 .45 .38
Age of youngest:
Youngest kid 0 to 3 .76 .67 .72 .63 .70 .62
Youngest kid 3 to 6 .52 .44 .51 .43 .47 .41
Youngest kid 6 to 18 .47 .39 .47 .38 .44 .36
No kids .40 .33 .39 .32 .33 .27
Education level:
Below GCSE .59 .54 .57 .52 .59 .53
GCSE .52 .45 .51 .43 .49 .42
A-levels .49 .41 .48 .39 .43 .36
Higher education .46 .37 .45 .36 .39 .31
University .42 .33 .42 .32 .35 .26
Table 2.1: Wage Elasticities
Model No Part-Time Wages No Demand Constraints Demand Constraints
Elasticities Intensive Participation Intensive Participation Intensive Participation
All -.14 -.14 -.15 -.14 -.13 -.12
Age of youngest:
Youngest kid 0 to 3 -.14 -.15 -.13 -.14 -.13 -.14
Youngest kid 3 to 6 -.23 -.22 -.23 -.21 -.19 -.18
Youngest kid 6 to 18 -.18 -.17 -.18 -.16 -.15 -.14
No kids -.03 -.03 -.05 -.04 -.05 -.04
Education level:
Below GCSE -.10 -.11 -.10 -.12 -.10 -.11
GCSE -.12 -.12 -.13 -.12 -.12 -.11
A-levels -.14 -.14 -.14 -.14 -.12 -.12
Higher education -.17 -.16 -.17 -.15 -.14 -.12
University -.21 -.18 -.20 -.17 -.17 -.14
Table 2.2: Income elasticities
89
Chapter 2 Labour supply of French married women, a structural approach.
2.5 Paje reform evaluation: Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ vs Structural
model
In this section, I simulate the impact of modifying the 2007 Paje system for mothers
of young children back to the 2004 APE system. I can then compare the predictions
from my models with the overall impact of the reform evaluated via a Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ
on the same groups of women. The Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ follows the total impact specification
of chapter 1, section 5 where the pre-period was composed of the years 2001-2003
and post-period the years 2007-2009. I will check the evaluations for the same demo-
graphic groups as in chapter 1, along the extensive and the intensive margin. The
structural model also allows me to diﬀerentiate clearly the impact of diﬀerent com-
ponents of the reform. I can evaluate the sole impact of the attribution of stay-home
subsidies to mothers of a first child. I also check that the small increase in transfers to
mothers who choose to decrease their hours of work to look after a young child had a
negligible impact. Finally, I can shed some light on the overall impact in the changes
of thresholds to the income transfers received by many households. The results are
presented in Table 2.3 below.
When simulating the policy changes, .along the extensive margin, the model specifi-
cation really aﬀects the size of the simulated policy impact for mothers of one child
younger than one. This is important as these women were the most aﬀected by the
changes in incentives to come back to work following a birth. Without demand con-
straints, the extensive margin responses simulated by the model are nearly twice the
reduced-form estimate. With demand constraints, the model simulates an impact
much closer to the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate. Looking at the other groups,
the model correctly predicts the absence of changes in the employment rates of moth-
ers with only one child aged one to three. It predicts an increase in the employment
rate of mothers with two children whose youngest is one to three by 1.7 percentage
points, while the reduced form estimate is more than double that. This is particu-
larly reassuring because my model does not account for the fall in net childcare prices
resulting from the modification in childcare subsidies (I use the 2007 childcare prices
in the model). This suggests, that a big part of the positive reaction to the policy
from this group of women does indeed come from the childcare subsidies. Finally, the
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fall observed in the employment rates of mothers with two children whose youngest
is below one, is particularly puzzling given the changes in work-incentives they faced.
I already discussed this in the first chapter and advanced that changes in social atti-
tudes and/or peer eﬀects might explain it. The evidence provided by the simulation
results reinforces that argument.
Along the intensive margin, the model predicts no changes in hours worked while
in employment and this is observed in the data in all groups except mothers of two
children whose youngest is below one. The reduced-form estimates suggest that those
mothers who quickly came back to work after the birth of their second child were able
to increase their working hours (probably thanks to the childcare subsidies and the
priority rules associated with siblings).
The structural models also allow me to specifically disentangle the eﬀect of the dif-
ferent transfer changes. It appears that the reaction of mothers whose first child is
younger than one is entirely driven (as one would expect) by the eligibility to the
stay-home benefits. For mothers of two children whose youngest is one to three, the
changes in part-time work incentives through the CLCA (ex-APE) had very limited
impact. The changes in the income transfer thresholds that was problematic for the
interpretation of my results in chapter 1, suggest that this policy change may have
increased the employment rate by 1.3 percentage points (roughly a third of the 3.6
percentage points estimated by the DID), which is in line with what I found in Chap-
ter 1 when I excluded the women who were most likely to have been aﬀected by these
income threshold changes.
Along the intensive margin, as expected the rise in part-time work incentives through
the CLCA (ex-APE) had a very limited negative impact (less than minus twelve
minutes of work a week) and this eﬀect would have been oﬀset by the increase in
full-time work incentives induced by the income transfer thresholds changes.
Overall this exercise is reassuring along two dimensions. On the one hand, it sug-
gests that the structural model with demand constraints can be trusted for policy
simulations exercises (and probably more than the models without the double-hurdle
specification). On the other hand, it confirms the conclusions from chapter 1: the fall
in employment for mothers of a first child is entirely driven by the eligibility to stay-
home subsidies. The increase in employment among mothers of two children whose
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youngest is older than one can mainly be attributed to childcare subsidies . The fall
in employment for these mothers when the youngest is below one cannot be explained
by any changes in the work incentives they faced and should be attributed to other
factors (such as peer eﬀects or changes in societal attitudes).
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2.6 Conclusion:
This chapter showed that the double-hurdle and part-time wages specification de-
creased the elasticities of labour supply simulated by a discrete choice labour supply
model. Controlling for the existence of barriers to work was necessary to modify
the simulated impact of the 2004 Paje policy changes closer to the Diﬀerence-in-
Diﬀerences estimate. Without such constraints, the labour supply model overesti-
mates the impact of the reform. For smaller reforms, the predicted labour supply
reactions are very close no matter what model was specified. Bargain et al (2010)
arrived at similar conclusions using German data.
In terms of better understanding the 2004 Paje reform, the diﬀerent policy simulations
confirm the main results from chapter 1: the fall in employment rate for first-time
mothers is entirely due to stay-home subsidies. The fall in employment rate of mothers
who just had their second child is puzzling when considering the changes in work-
incentives they face and should be attributed to indirect eﬀects of the policy. The
increase in the employment rate of mothers with two children whose youngest is above
one is a combination of changes in income transfer eligibilities and mainly a change
in childcare subsidies generosity.
Being confident in the double-hurdle with part-time wage penalties model specifica-
tion, I estimate the exact same model on a sample of British married women in the
next chapter. This allows me to better understand the determinants of cross-country
hours of work diﬀerences. I will then use the model to briefly study the impact that
joint-taxation in France has on married women’s (with working husbands) labour
supply.
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2.6 Conclusion:
Appendix:
No Part-Time Wages No Demand Constraints Demand Constraints
Parameter (s.e) Par. (s.e) Par. (s.e)
βy : age .1177938 (.2342492) .2969375 (.2562993) -.0211404 ( .3442384)
age squared -.4425467 . (.7440443) -.9975328 (.8199947) .0956037 (1.081601)
Paris .0363812 (.0808591) .0699259 (.0887306) .0634008 (.1172478)
left school before 16 y.o -.153455 (.0950228) -.1586632 (.105265) -.2830348 (.1394994)
constant 1.386172 (.7636662 ) .8465666 (.824654) 2.109509 (1.12682)
βh: age .0025424 (.0340199) -.0194026 (.0365332) .0319474 (.0462901)
age squared -.020723 ( .1088982) .0464243 (.1180091) -.1739887 (.1488431)
Paris .0400427 (.0147043) .0310462 (.0153028) .0328435 (.017699)
age of youngest kid 0 to3 .0045387 ( .0078413) .0109703 (.0083239) .0005985 (.009133)
age of youngest kid 3 to6 -.0085806 (.0072565) -.0071881 (.007409) -.0153598 (.0079)
number of dependent kids -.0346241 ( .0028045) -.0335959 (.0028802) -.0355333 (.003013)
left school before 16 y.o -.0346241 ( .0028045) .031257 (.0167557) .0513159 ( .0207549)
constant -.4367367 (.116767) -.3608379 (.1245348) -.5106735 (.1581345)
αy : -.0377106 (.0049611) -.0375474 (.0053681) -.038754 (.006096)
αh: .0061968 (.0006724) .0059398 (.0007946) .005777 (.0009167)
αyh: .0088524 (.0013955 ) .008492 (.0015243) .0079727 (.0016939)
ρ: -.2418728 (.1118455) -.3444242 (.1100562) .0268267 (.1254705)
Note: income was divided by 100
Table 2.4: Utility Functions
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No Part-Time Wages No Demand Constraints Demand Constraints
Parameter (s.e) Par. (s.e) Par. (s.e)
FC constant -1.724124 (.3628312) -1.838811 (.4026316) -1.834302 (.3826994)
Paris 1.214525 (2162396) 1.04928 (.2288573) .9096733 (.2218583)
age of youngest kid 0 to3 .3076515 (.2157944) .461925 (.2269392) .2855556 (.2106917)
age of youngest kid 3 to6 .0237745 (.2010472) .0606426 (.2033997) .0210882 (.1884332)
number of kids -.6928487 (.0870376) -.6362418 (.0859905) -.4555657 (.0764048)
FC Full-Time -.659892 (.0689106) -.602895 (.0817324) -.5366605 (.079718)
Table 2.5: Fixed Costs of Work
No Part-Time Wages No Demand Constraints Demand Constraints
Parameter (s.e) Parameter (s.e) Parameter (s.e)
Local unemployment rate . . . . -11.70016 (2.183749)
Age . . . . .2319446 (.0923116)
Constant . . . . 1.40013 (.3432415)
Table 2.6: Employment probabilities
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2.6 Conclusion:
All hours
No Part-Time Wages
Par. (s.e)
age .2546032 (.0332252 )
age squared -.4025158 (.1151989)
education level 1 .1987293 (.0167089 )
education level 2 .3815646 (.0180999)
education level 3 .6001042 (.0199817)
education level 4 .7050709 (.0194829)
Paris .1654523 (.013098)
constant 1.420786 . (1051882)
ln(σj) -1.036607 (.0156769)
Table 2.7: Wage equation in the model with no part-time penalties and employment
constraints
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Child-care first-stage regressions:
The four income groups each contain about a quarter of the households, households
with disposable incomes below 2000€ belong to group 1, households with disposable
incomes between 2000€ and 3000€ belong to group 2, households with disposable
incomes between 3000€ and 4000€ to group 3, and households with disposable income
above 4000€ to group 4. The following Table 2.10 presents the childcare hourly cost
(per child) distribution for each household group:
Price range 0 ]0,.5] ].5,1] ]1,1.5] ]1.5,2] >2
Income group 1 .45 .26 .17 .06 .01 .05
Income group 2 .32 .18 .35 .08 .03 .04
Income group 3 .16 .18 .32 .16 .11 .06
Income group 4 .11 .06 .16 .21 .17 .29
Table 2.10: Frequency in price range (Euros)
constant (s.e) slope (s.e)
Income group 1 7.80323 (3.974517) .2461619 (.1215633)
Income group 2 8.23608 (2.973548) .3805881 (.0921147)
Income group 3 20.42692 (3.111333) .1666463 (.0936205)
Income group 4 16.16387 (3.17261) .4512845 (.0898695)
Table 2.11: Hours of childcare per child and hours of work:
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3 Why do married women work less
in the UK than in France?
3.1 Overview
Using household level data and detailed tax programs, I try to understand why the
number of hours worked by British married women is lower than that of French
married women. I find that in the presence of children, British mothers are far
more responsive to financial incentives. Husbands earnings and their interaction with
childcare prices seem to play an important role. Nevertheless, the fall in hours worked
in the British households with children, despite facing lower taxes than in France,
remains somewhat puzzling in the light of conventional explanations. It could be
mainly attributed (in the framework used) to diﬀerent preferences.
3.2 Introduction:
In an influential paper, Prescott (2004) uses a representative agent model to under-
stand international diﬀerences in average hours worked. He claims that most of the
cross-country variation can be explained by variation in tax rates. His approach does
not allow for extensive responses, relies on a very high estimate of labour supply elas-
ticity and does not consider heterogeneity among individuals. Following studies, by
Rogerson (2006, 2008) and Blundell et al (2012), look at the extensive and intensive
margins of work for diﬀerent categories of the population in the OECD countries.
They find high cross-country diﬀerences for the young and old workers, suggesting
that other institutions (such as early retirement schemes for instance) may play a role
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in the international diﬀerences of hours worked. Blanchard (2004) believes that the
answer is to be found in diﬀerences in preferences and culture. Lungqvist and Sargent
(2006) incorporate the benefit system (in addition to taxes) in a calibrated macroeco-
nomic model and restate the puzzle as why do Europeans work so much given the tax
and benefit systems they face. Alesina et al (2005) argue that Europeans work much
less because of Union policies in the 1970’s and 80’s, and highly regulated labour
markets. They also advance without much evidence that “tax rates diﬀerences could
explain most of the cross-country diﬀerences in hours worked among married women,
but not for men”.
Surprisingly, not much attention has been paid to the diﬀerent female attitudes across
countries (except in Blundell et al (2012)). The aim of this paper is to fill that gap
and check the validity of the above statement. Using household level data (Labour
Force Surveys and childcare surveys in 2007) combined with precise information on
the taxes and transfers faced by married women in the UK and France, I estimate the
same labour supply model in each country. This allows me to estimate preferences
and elasticities across the two countries, while controlling for costs of work, part-time
wage penalties and employment constraints.
The reason for choosing these two countries is that they figure (respectively) in the
middle and lowest rank of Prescott classification of average hours worked in the
OECD. Among the European countries, the UK is considered the one with the lowest
taxes, the most flexible labour market and Anglo-Saxon preferences for leisure (they
would enjoy leisure less than their Continental neighbours), whereas France is asso-
ciated with high taxes, heavily regulated labour markets and a high preference for
leisure.
If one was to predict the hours worked by married women, it would be tempting to
predict that they work much more in the United Kingdom than in France. As we
will see, the opposite is observed in the data. I find that the cost of childcare and, its
interaction with income available outside work (through the husband’s earnings) can
fully explain the observed gap. part-time wage penalties could also explain a fraction
of the observed hours gap for mothers of very young children.
The underlying labour supply seems wider than suggested by the data (once country-
specific institutions and constraints are accounted for). The specification chosen and
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data available allows me to identify the impact of childcare costs on labour supply
choices. Unfortunately, I cannot control for the quality and availability of childcare
due to data limitation. As a result, the preferences for leisure appear much higher for
British mothers. Such a result should be taken with a pinch of salt. It could in fact
reflect the lack of satisfactory care options for mothers in the UK.
The model estimated is a static labour supply one. Childless married women work
slightly more in the UK than in France. The estimation results suggest that British
married women are less attached to the labour market (particularly to full-time jobs)
during motherhood, compared to French women. This might be a side-eﬀect of a more
flexible labour market. If it is diﬃcult to re-enter the labour market (after raising
children) for a French mother, she would be more reluctant to give up a full-time
position. I can identify such a mechanism at work, but a life-cycle specification of
labour supply choices would be welcome to estimate its true size and importance.
In the following section I describe more specifically what I observe in the data. In
Section 4, I justify the choice of looking only at married mothers with working hus-
bands, leaving aside single-mothers and unmarried women in couples. In Section 5,
I briefly describe and compare (through budget constraints) the UK and French tax
systems. In Section 6, I look at descriptive statistics to address diﬀerent explanations
and justify my choices of modeling. The slight diﬀerences in the childcare costs in the
structural labour supply model are presented in Section 7. The model estimates are
presented and put into perspective in Section 8. Section 9 presents diﬀerent policy
experiments. Section 10 concludes.
3.3 What we observe in the data: Labour Force
Surveys 2007
3.3.1 Decomposing the data for all 25-50 years old women
according to age and marital status.
Modeling the education and retirement decisions are above the scope of the paper,
as a result, I focus on the 25 to 50 years old age group. In this section I look at
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the average hours of work per marital status. The first point to draw attention to,
in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, are the higher average hours worked in France for women in
all types of households. As documented in Blundell et al (2012), female workers join
the labour force earlier in the UK than in France, but from their late twenties, the
hours of work in France are slightly higher at all ages, and particularly during the
child-rearing years.
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Average Hours of Work for all women, by age
Figure 3.1: Aggregate hours of work
for all women, by age
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Average Hours of Work for all women working, by age
Figure 3.2: Average working hours
for all women, by age
Nevertheless when looking into more details, it appears that the narrative diﬀers a
little wether women are married or not. As Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show, for married
women no clear pattern emerges along the extensive margin of work, whereas along
the intensive, it is very apparent that once in the labour market, French married
women work longer hours.
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Figure 3.3: Employment rates of
married women, by age
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Figure 3.4: Average working hours of
married women, by age
When focusing on non-married women, the narrative is slightly diﬀerent (Figures 3.5
and 3.6), there is a clear diﬀerence along the extensive margin, but once these women
have decided to work, their choices of hours do not diﬀer a lot across countries. This
is true if they are in out-of-wedlock couples:
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Employment Rates for women in non−married couples
Figure 3.5: Employment rates of
women in couples (non-married),
by age
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Figure 3.6: Average working hours of
women in couples (non-married), by
age
And is particularly striking for single women in Figures 3.7 and 3.8.
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Figure 3.7: Employment rates of sin-
gle women, by age
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Figure 3.8: Average working hours of
single women, by age
I will argue further down, that the composition of the single women and non-married
women groups may diﬀer across countries, making any insightful comparison diﬃcult.
In that project, I will focus on understanding what causes the diﬀerences observed
across countries for married women.
3.3.2 The presence of kids in married households impacts women
diﬀerently in the two countries:
I now look into more details at married women. When looking at the extensive and
intensive margins of work om Figures 3.9 and 3.10, it is very interesting to note that
the extensive margins are rather similar across both countries no matter what the
age of the youngest kid is. A very diﬀerent picture emerges on the intensive margin
of work, in the presence of children, married British females decrease their hours of
work, and a large majority work part-time:
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Figure 3.9: Employment rates of
married women, by age of the
youngest
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Figure 3.10: Average working hours
of married women, by age of the
youngest
Looking at the hours distribution in both countries (Figures 3.11 and 3.12) it becomes
evident that the majority of married British mothers work part-time as opposed to
France.
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Figure 3.11: Working hours distribu-
tion in the UK, by age of the
youngest (married women)
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Figure 3.12: Working hours distribu-
tion in the UK, by age of the
youngest (married women)
This drop in working hours in the presence of children is observed at every education
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levels. Figures 3.13 and 3.14 compare the intensive margin of work for married women
with no kids and two kids by education level in each country:
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Figure 3.13: Average working hours
of married women with no children,
by education level
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Figure 3.14: Average working hours
of married women with two children,
by education level
The interesting question to ask now is can the tax and benefits explain this diﬀerent
intensity of work for mothers (as advanced by Alesina et al. (2005)) or are there other
factors that explain the labour supply diﬀerences? But first I will discuss why I focus
on that specific sub-group of the population.
3.4 Comparing the observable characteristics of
married and non-married households in each
country:
A cross-country study is not short of problems and diﬃculties. An individual with
the same unobservable characteristics, having lived in diﬀerent countries may have
encountered herself with diﬀerent institutions, incentives, culture and her position
at a certain time in her life may be the result of successive selection into particular
states (education, marital status, fertility for instance). I want to focus on married
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females in the two countries because they appear similar across key margins. Prime-
age married women, had their first child on average at 27.5 years in the UK and 26.7
years in France. Table 3.8 in the appendix describes the close distribution of children
among them. The education distribution of married women are strikingly similar as
reported in Table 3.8 in the appendix. In 2007, the average age at first marriage was
29.8 in the UK and 29.5 in France. The number of divorces per thousand married
couples was 11.8 in the UK and 10.7 in France. The husbands of these women do
not appear very diﬀerent: they work slightly longer hours in the UK (Table 3.8 in
the appendix), but their choices are not aﬀected by the presence of children in either
country. The average husband’s age in my sample is 41.6 in the UK and 39.4 in
France. Also, looking at Figure 3.15, the husbands’ hourly productivities distribution
does not appear to be higher in one country, it is more spread in the UK, but not
shifted to the right or left of the French distribution. All this evidence suggests that
focusing only on households where the husbands work may not be too restrictive to
understand the mechanisms aﬀecting married women’s choices of labour supply on
both sides of the Channel.
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Figure 3.15: Husbands’wage distributions in the UK and France
In the UK, the decision to live single instead of in a couple might be influenced by
the tax-benefit system. Once in a couple it appears very unlikely that the tax-benefit
system would aﬀect the decision to get married (Adam & Brewer 2011). In France
there might be a penalty/premium for living as married and not simply cohabiting
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as well as for living single as opposed to in a couple (each of these status aﬀects
the calculation of "parts" in the Quotient Familial as explained in the appendix). The
proportion of women married are similar in both countries (Table 3.8 in the appendix).
Among non-married women, the distribution between those declaring themselves as
single or in couple diﬀers a lot. I take the view that a woman may face an ordered
choice where she goes from single to cohabiting and then to married. So the decision
to live as single or cohabiting could be influenced by the tax benefit systems, but the
impact of tax-benefit systems on the decision to get married once in a couple would
be negligible. I will consider that the similar ages at first marriage, divorce rates and
marriage rates in the two countries point towards similar attitudes to marriage, on
which the influence of the tax-benefit system is negligible. I rely on the results of
Ellwood (2000) and Lundberg & Pollack (2007) that do not find evidence of taxes
having an impact on marriage decisions.
I do not aim to model the education decision, and will consider it as fixed. As
to fertility, I will assume that the impact of financial incentives on it is negligible.
Baughmann and Dickert-Conlin (2003 and 2009) do not find conclusive evidence that
fertility is influenced by taxes and financial incentives, while Laroque and Salanie
(2008) find some correlation.
Married women may still diﬀer along unobservable characteristics across the two coun-
tries. Their tastes for leisure or time spent with children, and for income may vary.
This is why it is important that I estimate a labour supply model accounting for
preference heterogeneity in each population. I will not explicitly model any intra-
household bargaining mechanism as incorporating the bargaining over joint-taxation
in France would prove to be extremely challenging, for that same reason (and for
the lack of cross-country variation in the husbands hours of work) I will consider the
husband’s decision to work as fixed. By ignoring non-married women, I will not be
able to control for potential unobserved marriage tastes. I rely on the similarities
discussed above to assume that the married women are comparable individuals across
the Channel.
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3.5 Diﬀerent tax and benefit systems:
The following sub-section intends to describe the specificities of the tax systems (for
the keen reader) as succinctly and clearly as possible. The reader can jump directly
to section 4.2, where I highlight how the tax and benefit systems interact and result
in individual-specific average and marginal tax rates.
3.5.1 Tax systems facing married households in each country:
3.5.1.1 Brief overview of the UK tax and benefit system:
Main benefits aﬀecting married households: The main benefits for families with
children are the child benefit and the child tax credit. The former is non-taxable, non-
contributory and non-means tested. It’s payable to all families regardless of income.
The rate is higher for the eldest child, then lower for subsequent children. The Child
Tax Credit is paid on top of child benefit to the main carer in the family. It is
independent of employment status. The claimer needs to be responsible for at least
one child below 16 years old (or 19 if at school). It is important to note that it is
joint means tested with the Working Tax Credit. The CTC is made up of a family
element, a baby element and a child element. Below 100.11£ a week it is fully paid,
it is then withdrawn (with the WTC) at a rate of 37%. There is a second income
threshold of 958£ up to which the family is guaranteed the family element.
Low income household can receive four major benefits: the income support, the Work-
ing Tax Credit, housing benefits and council tax benefits. The income support is
means tested but non-taxable and non-contributory. The family income needs to be
below a certain applicable amount, and the benefit would top up the family resources
to that amount. It entitles the household to maximum housing and council tax ben-
efits. The WTC is non taxable, non-contributory, and means tested. It provides
in-work support for low paid working adults. For families with children to be eligi-
ble, at least one adult should work 16 or more hours per week (30h if no kids in the
household). It is made up of a basic element, a couple element, a 30 hours element
(if the worker works 30 hours or more). Importantly it also has a childcare element:
if both parents work more than 16 hours a week, it reimburses childcare costs up to
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140£ a week with one child and 240£ with more children. But this childcare element
gets tapered away like the rest of the tax-credits. The housing and council tax bene-
fits are both non taxable, non contributory and means tested. The housing benefits
helps families with low incomes to cover their rent, the maximum level is equal to the
“eligible rent” minus deductions for non dependents. This “eligible rent” is capped at
a “local reference rent”. The amount of benefits received depends on the household
income relative to the “applicable amount”, which varies with the number of children.
If the family income is above that applicable amount, the housing benefits get tapered
away. The council tax benefit conditions are very similar to the housing benefits, and
it covers the cost of part (or the entirety) of the council tax.
Taxes on income derived from work: Each worker in the household pays the income
tax and national insurance contributions. For income below 6,035£ a year, no income
tax has to be paid. The tax rate is then 20% up to £34,800 of taxable income and
40% above. The national insurance contributions are paid by the employee on her
gross wage and by the employer. For weekly earnings below 105£, both employee
and employer pay no contributions, between 105£ and 770£ the employee standard
rate is 11% and 12.8% for the employer. Above 770£, the former drops to 1% and
the second remains at 12.8%. Households also pay the council tax that depends on
the band rate of their property. As reported in the appendix, social contributions
generally represent slightly less than 20% of the cost to employer
3.5.1.2 Brief overview of the French tax-benefit system for married households
Main benefits aﬀecting married households: The child benefit is independent of
the household’s resources, all families with at least two kids below 20 years old are
eligible. They are larger for kids above 11 years old and 16 years old, except for the
oldest kid in a family with two children. The family complement is available to families
with three or more kids between the ages of three and twenty-one. It is conditional on
resources and family composition. Eligible families get 155.05€ whatever the family
composition is. Families with kids below three years old may be entitled to the PAJE
and receive 171.06€ per month. There is a complement if the mum decides to stop
full time work, or reduce her activity to part-time job. If both parents work, part
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of the childcare costs can be covered. It’s awarded conditional on resources of the
household and family composition. Depending on their resources and composition,
families with children between the age of 6 and 18 receive in September of each year
a school benefit (272.57€) per child to help cover the costs of schooling. In 2007, low
income households could claim the RMI (income support). It was replaced in 2008
by a similar benefit called the RSA. It is a benefit that tops up the household income
to a minimum level. To be eligible you need to be more than 25 years old and have
resources below a minimum level that varies with the household composition. When
one member of the household finds a job, he keeps the RMI for the first three months.
After, for 9 months, only 50% of the revenues from work are taken into account in
the RMI calculation, or she receives a monthly premium of if she works more than
78 hours a week. If the household has no housing rents or mortgage repayments,
or receives housing benefits, a fixed amount (household demographics dependent) is
deducted from the RMI payment. When receiving the RMI, you do not pay council
tax and are eligible for housing benefits. Housing benefits are resources-dependent and
their calculation is very complicated (the details of it are described in the appendix),
the size of the transfer is equal to the rent and housing costs of which are taken out a
personal participation. Once the final transfer has been calculated, it is taxed by the
CRDS at 0.5%.
Household taxes: The income tax is household-specific (not individual). The tax-
able income is composed of the net salary and other sources of income (especially
financial, and/or housing). To be more precise, you are taxable on your net salary,
to which the CRDS need be included and part of the CSG. Some deductions apply
on that initial taxable income estimate. Now, the specificities of the French system
kick in. First of all, you are assigned a number of “parts” linked to your household
demographics. With the taxable income and the number of parts N , you obtain your
family ratio “Quotient familial” as the ratio of taxable income to the number of parts.
If your taxable income is below a part-specific level, you are not taxable. If you are
taxable, the calculation becomes more complicated and more specific details are re-
ported in the appendix. It is important to note that more than half of the French
households do not pay any income tax. Every working member of the household is
also eligible for a small in-work tax credit (Prime pour l’emploi), that depends on
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the number of working adults, the number of kids and work income. Finally, every
household is liable to pay a council tax, based on a local renting value estimate of
the house. The tax level is aﬀected by local and national rates as well as family
and/or income discounts. Local authorities can also apply a discount for low income
households and a general discount. People entitled to the RMI do not pay this tax.
Social contributions paid by the employee: These contributions vary with a thresh-
old called “plafond”. In 2007, the threshold for monthly salary was 2,682€. On their
gross salary, employees pay about 21.7% up to the threshold of contributions towards
various social insurance and retirement programs. Above the threshold, the rates
diﬀer and details are reported in the appendix.
Social contributions paid by the employer: The employer pays about 38.2% of the
gross salary in social contributions up to the threshold and this rate will vary after
the threshold, more details are reported in the appendix.
Discount on social contributions for low salaries : Since 1993, discount on the so-
cial contributions paid by employers for low salaries have been introduced. They var-
ied throughout the years, and especially after the introduction of the 35h workweek in
1999. This reduction concerns the contributions to the “sickness,maternity,invalidity
and old age” insurances and to the family benefits. This discount is calculated as
follows:
Discount = Grossmonthly wage ∗ discount rate
The discount rate falls as the salaries rise, it is maximal at the minimum wage and
decreases linearly to reach zero at 1.6 times the minimum wage. It is defined as
follows:
Discount rate = (0.26) ∗ (1.6 ∗ gross hourly SMIC ∗ hoursworked0.6 ∗ monthly grosswage − 1)
It is important in France to estimate the cost to the employer for low-wage earners, as
this discount makes it very expensive for employers to increase net wages. As reported
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in the appendix, total social contributions generally represent slightly more than 40%
of the cost to employer.
3.5.2 Tax rates observed in the data:
It is very diﬃcult from the description above to understand what the tax rates faced
by married women are. To illustrate how tax rates are higher in France than in the
UK, I infer the average (participation) tax and marginal tax rates for each woman
observed working in my French sample under each country’s system. I then calculate
the diﬀerence between the tax rate she faces in France to the one she would face under
the UK system. I report the distribution of this statistic below. For instance, if her
eﬀective marginal tax rate was 30% in the UK and is 50% in France, the diﬀerence
between the two systems is of 20 percentage points and is reported in Figures 3.16
and 3.17 as 20%:
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Figure 3.16: Extra average (partici-
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Figure 3.17: Extra marginal tax
rates under the French tax system,
at observed hours
Of course, these tax rates are endogenous in the sense that those women would have
chosen their hours of work according to their budget constraint and the statistics
presented here do not reflect the entire slope of their budget constraint. By estimating
wage equations, I will be able to recover the potential tax rates faced by each woman at
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every hours choice and present a more rigorous statistic further down. These tax rate
diﬀerences appear quite important (for a major share of married women, the French
tax system makes them face average and marginal tax rates around 15-20 percentage
points higher than under the British system). These results are not unrealistic. The
OECD computes the average and marginal tax wedge in each of its member countries
for typical households. In Table 3.1 below I report their estimates for married couples
in the UK and France. The marginal wedges computed by the OECD appear smaller
than mine, but they are the ones for the principal earner in the household. The OECD
calculations also do not account properly for the reduction in benefits on the tax rates
(for instance in the UK the large discrepancy for the average wedges is explained by
the loss of working and child tax credits when the main earner works).
OECD evaluations Author’s evaluations
UK France UK France
Two children
One earner at 100% of av.earnings, one at 33%
Average wedge (principal earner) 26.4 39.9 49.4 53.6
Marginal wedge (principal earner) 40.6 48.3 43.0 50.4
One earner at 100% of av.earnings, one at 67%
Average wedge (principal earner) 29.9 44.8 38.7 48.8
Marginal wedge (principal earner) 46.5 51.2 47.4 51.9
No children
One earner at 100% of av.earnings, one at 33%
Average wedge (principal earner) 30.8 43.3 35.1 50.0
Marginal wedge (principal earner) 40.6 51.2 41.6 51.9
Table 3.1: Tax wedges for two-earners married couples, OECD 2007 evaluations vs
author’s calculations
In France the joint taxation, may also aﬀect the tax rates paid by women, compared
to the situation where the couple would not be married. It could increase the marginal
tax rates (if the husband has a very high income say), or it could also decrease it (
the Quotient familial is a rebate on taxable income), and I study its impact in the
final chapter of this thesis.
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3.5.3 Budget constraints:
The following graphs (Figures 3.18 and 3.19) show the budget constraint faced by a
married woman in a household with kids aged 5 and 11. Both the female and male earn
the median observed hourly wage in the French sample, the male work the average
hours observed for males. The wage was translated to the corresponding employer
hourly cost so that when passed onto the UK system it could be fully compared. The
exchange rate used is the OECD estimate of the PPP for the year 2007. The results
are striking, the exact same household would have a higher income than in France, at
all hours level, from the woman not working to working full-time. The marginal tax
rates appear higher in France than in the UK:
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Figure 3.18: Budget constraints for
married woman with one child
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Figure 3.19: Budget constraints for
married woman with two children
3.5.4 Household income if the woman is not working:
We have seen previously that the hourly wage and hours of work distribution of
husbands do not diﬀer incredibly across the two countries. Yet the UK tax system
leaves households with a higher net disposable income if only the husband works. To
make that point clear, I infer the net disposable income (for each household in my
French sample) if only the husband works under both tax systems. I then take the
ratio of that net disposable income outside work in the UK to the one in France. The
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distribution of these ratios on the sample of French women are reported in Figure
3.20. A ratio value of 1.2 for a household would mean that the income available to
the household when the woman does not work (but the husband does) is 20% higher
in the UK than in France.
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Figure 3.20: Ratio of outside work income : UK to France
This discussion makes it clear that French married households are more heavily taxed
than in the UK. It might be useful to pause for a moment the narrow scope of the
paper, and briefly focus on the two countries tax and benefit spendings as a share of
GDP. Once again, I rely on data for the OECD to construct Tables 3.2 and 3.3 below.
Most of the extra-revenue generated by the French tax authorities comes from higher
employer social contributions. And most of that extra tax income for the authorities
appear to be spent on old age pensions in France:
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UK France
Income, profits, capital gains
Individuals 10.8 7.5
Corporates 3.4 3.0
Total 14.1 10.4
Soc.security contributions
Employees 2.6 4.1
Employers 3.8 11.0
Self-employed 0.2 1.2
Total 6.6 16.2
Taxes on property 4.5 3.5
Taxes on goods & services 10.4 10.9
Other taxes 0 2.6
Total 35.8 43.7
Table 3.2: Tax revenue as % of GDP 2007
UK France
Old age 5.7 11.1
Survivors 0.2 1.8
Incapacity related 2.5 1.8
Health 6.9 8.7
Family 3.3 3.0
Active labour mkt policies 0.3 0.9
Unemployment 0.4 1.2
Housing 1.1 0.8
Other 0.2 0.3
Total 20.4 29.7
Table 3.3: Social expenditure as % of GDP 2007
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3.5.5 A simple tax rate explanation implausible:
A simple tax argument a la Prescott to understand the lower hours worked despite
lower tax rates faced by married women in the UK would require backward bending
labour supply curves, where the income eﬀect is very strong and quickly dominates the
substitution eﬀect. Even though the magnitude of the eﬀect would probably need to
be much higher than what is usually observed in the literature, I will estimate utility
functions that allow for the possibility of backward bending labour supply curves.
Tax rates do not appear to be the main driver of the hours worked diﬀerences ob-
served, and other aspects of the institutional framework facing these women need to
be discussed and accounted for.
3.6 Other institutions:
3.6.1 Childcare prices higher in the UK than in France:
If for every hour that the mother works, she has to pay a price of hourly childcare
for her kids to be looked after, this is equivalent to a fall in her net hourly wage, and
this is the sort of mechanism that depreciate the intensive margin of work. It is hard
to obtain the exact price paid by households for nurseries but some evidence on the
average prices in the two countries exist.
According to yearly surveys realised by the daycare trust, the average weekly price
for a nursery (under 2 years old) in 2007 was 152£, 140£ (if above 2 years old) for
50h a week which amounts to about 3£/hour. For after school club (keeping in mind
that school finishes usually around 3pm in the UK) it is at 38£/week for 15h or
2.53£/hour. These are prices paid by parents before receiving the childcare element
of the WTC. It is crucial to note that households with earnings above 16,000£ a year
are not entitled to the WTC and its childcare subsidy. During holidays, parents would
pay on average 77£ a week for their child’s care.
In France, according to a survey realised in 2007 by the Drees, on average the gross
cost for an hour in a nursery is 2.7 Euros, but after tax deductions and subsidies
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comes down to 1.2 Euros. According to this study only half of pre-school age kids
are looked after through formal paid care. In France the price you pay for a nursery
is equal to 0.005% of your taxable income per hour. There is no such things as after
school clubs in France. After school hours, kids can stay from 4.30pm to usually 6pm
under supervision in the schools for a small price that varies across cities.
In its 2007 report, the Daycare trust claimed :“Parents in the UK pay around 70% of
the price of childcare, compared with European parents who pay around 30% of their
childcare cost”.
In July 2010, the insurance company Aviva released the results from their COTS
(Cost of the sibling) study interviewing households in the UK with two kids: their
result is maybe provocative but deserves further investigation : “Millions of "average"
two-child families are being forced to cut their working hours as they struggle to cover
the cost of childcare”. This was echoed in the Guardian and other newspapers.
It is therefore crucial to control for hourly childcare costs in my model.
3.6.2 Labour market rigidities:
There might be some rigidities in the Labour market that prevent married women
to choose their hours of work optimally. According to Table 3.9 in the appendix, in
France, the mothers seem constrained to work less than they would desire, and in the
UK, if anything, they would prefer to work less. I believe it is important to account
for such constraints to work and will try to incorporate it in my model as conveniently
as possible.
The minimum wage may also be a barrier to employment, making it diﬃcult or impos-
sible for low productive women to find a job. When looking at the wage distributions
in each country (Figures 3.21 and 3.22), there are no mass points around the mini-
mum wage. This result may seem at odds with previous findings in France by Laroque
and Salanie (2002). They look at data at the end of the 1990’s, and since then, the
real minimum wage in France has not increased. It might also be the case that the
minimum wage is particularly binding for young workers that are not in my sample
of 25 to 50 years old women. Evidence in the UK points in that direction, Brewer
et al (2009) find that the minimum wage is most likely to aﬀect single women below
121
Chapter 3 Why do married women work less in the UK than in France?
the age of 25. Because it does not appear particularly binding in the data I will not
account for a minimum wage barrier in my model.
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Figure 3.21: Wage distribution and
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Figure 3.22: Wage distribution and
minimum wage in France
The part-time wage penalty may also diﬀer in both countries, and could be an impor-
tant factor in explaining the pre-dominance of part-time work among British women,
so I will estimate part-time and full-time wage equations in my model.
3.7 A model of Labour Supply:
I estimate the model of Chapter 2 on the sample of British married women with
working husbands as well. The specification is exactly the same with the exception of
the full-time work option in the UK being 40 hours instead of 35. The childcare prices
enter the model in the same manner even though the household groups are defined
according to their demographic characteristics in the UK as in Blundell et al (2000).
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3.8 Data and estimation results :
3.8.1 Data:
I use the Labour Force Survey and its French equivalent ( Enquete Emploi en Con-
tinu). In order to minimise the impact of negative business cycles, I study the year
2007 (just before the start of the Great Recession). The surveys sizes, designs, and
questions are extremely similar and enable me to confidently compare demographic
and key variables such as hours of work or earnings. In the sample under study, I
focus on married households where the wife is between 25 and 50 years old, where
neither the head nor the wife is studying, self-employed, retired, a member in the
forces or seriously disabled. About the same share of the initial population is cut
from the samples in both countries (the disabled population proved to be challeng-
ing, as the incapacity benefit is perceived by far more households than the Allocation
Adulte Handicape in France. As a result I consider households in the UK as seriously
disabled if they receive a disability living allowance, the proportion of disabled house-
holds in each country are then of the same magnitude). I drop women working as
teachers or professors as they are likely to report working part-time when in reality
they work full-time but don’t account for the preparation work done at home. I also
drop observations with unrealistically low wages, or reporting paid work but no earn-
ings. I consider households where the husband is observed working. In France, most
of the non-working husbands are unemployed and infering their income would prove
extremely challenging with the information in the surveys. The shares of unemployed
husbands do not diﬀer much across countries, but the share of inactive husbands is
slightly higher in the UK (probably due to the diﬀerences in the number of claimants
of disability benefits).
To recover the childcare price distribution and hours of childcare usage per hours
worked I use the Family Resources Survey 2007. The information is collected on
married mothers observed working. Unfortunately, the data does not make publicly
available the location of households, and I am unable to separate households in London
from the rest of the country.
In France, no such standardised survey with childcare information exists. I use a
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survey collected by the Drees in 2007 called “ Mode de garde et d’accueil des jeunes
enfants”. A representative sample of 8,177 households with children below the age of
seven and a half were interviewed, and asked questions about all the types of childcare
used, the hours and price of each type of childcare and other demographic charac-
teristics. They were also asked about the childcare subsidies they receive. I do not
diﬀerentiate among types of childcare used, and consider the average net hourly price
of childcare paid per child. Most households tend to use one type of paying childcare.
This net price of childcare will be correlated with the household’s earnings and to
control for that I will separate the population according to net observed household
income. Implicitly, I am assuming that in France when a mother decides how much
to work, she will take the net hourly price of childcare as given and will not account
for the potential change due to diﬀerent household resources following a change in her
labour supply. This assumption seems hard to avoid due to data limitation, but may
not be too critical. The subsidies to private carers resemble a lump-sum reimburse-
ment of costs, where the generosity of that lump-sum transfer varies only according
to two income thresholds (as explained in the first chapter).
The results of the childcare regressions and details on the distribution of prices are
reported in the appendix. It is interesting to note that in France, few women pay
more than 1.5 Euros an hour, whereas in the UK paying more than 3 Pounds an hour
is not uncommon.
The net incomes in the UK are calculated using the Fortax library, in France, I am
grateful to Guy Laroque who let me use the routines he wrote for the French tax
system in the early 2000’s, I have updated and modified these routines to match the
2007 French tax system.
3.8.2 Estimates:
The parameter estimates are presented in the appendix.
In both countries income aﬀects utility positively. Its eﬀect decreases with age. In
both countries, the preferences for leisure increase in the presence of kids and especially
young kids, and for women who left school before the age of sixteen. Living in the
capital cities do not significanlty impact the tastes for work or income. The constant
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in the βh is negative and significant in France, but positive and not significant in
the UK. The opposite signs of the αh parameters may counteract this discrepancy.
In France, the correlation with productivity controling for selection eﬀects, is not
significant, but in the UK it is positive and significant.
In both countries there seems to be a benefit to working full-time as reflected by the
negative estimate for the full-time fixed cost of work term. This may reflect the fact
that full-time jobs are more valuable for human capital accumulation and lifetime
earnings. Also, living in the capital city has a significant cost, having children results
in a small benefit to working whereas having young children has a rather large sig-
nificant cost in France it has a small negative benefit in the UK. The negative fixed
costs of work estimated in both countries for the number of children seems counter-
intuitive. Combined with the eﬀect of children on preferences, it could mean that
for women with children, working a small number of hours per week is attractive for
career prospects. Van Soest (2002) also finds small negative fixed costs of work as-
sociated with children. Entering the labour market in the UK is generally associated
with a large (non-significant) fixed cost, whereas in France it is associated with a sig-
nificant benefit (that may again reflect the human capital argument discussed above,
in France finding a job might be hard, so being in the labour market facilitates the
transition between jobs and has a certain value in terms of lifetime earnings).
The constant on the probability of finding work is higher in the UK than in France
(which is expected). In France, age increases the probability of finding a job, but
the local unemployment rate has a very strong, significant and negative impact. In
the UK, the non-significant positive coeﬃcient of regional unemployment might be
explained by the fact that I only use regional unemployment rates (and not at the
council level) which is not specific enough (there are 17 diﬀerent values for that
variable in the UK and more than 90 in France). It could also reflect the fact that
2007 was an extremely buoyant year for the labour market in the UK everywhere in
the country. The negative coeﬃcient on age in the UK is rather surprising, and could
reflect the fact that older women would have worked part-time during child-rearing
years and are thus less likely to find work later on in their life.
Regarding the wage equations, the estimates are in line with economic theory predic-
tions. The distribution of unobservables when working 20 hours of work have a larger
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variance in France and the UK.
3.8.3 Fit of the model:
To check the fit of the model, I compute the average probabilities for each hours
category and compare it with the observed frequencies:
UK France
Hours Predicted Observed Predicted Observed
0 .265 .268 .271 281
All 20 .233 .232 .114 .113
30 .119 .119 .142 .138
Ft .382 .381 .472 .467
0 .431 .448 .431 .447
Youngest kid 20 .256 .247 .099 .092
0 to 3 30 .085 .084 .107 .128
Ft .227 .219 .360 .332
0 .372 .383 .305 .307
Youngest kid 20 .319 .309 .131 .121
3 to 5 30 .102 .112 .147 .163
Ft .207 .196 .416 .407
0 .229 .228 .238 .243
Youngest kid 20 .257 .274 .131 .131
>5 30 .140 .157 .157 .153
Ft .372 .341 .473 .473
0 .156 .175 .183 .202
No kids 20 .144 .137 .081 .091
30 .120 .094 .138 .104
Ft .578 .591 .597 .601
Table 3.4: Model fit
The model does a good job at replicating the observed frequencies. Accounting for
the selection mechanism explicitly slightly worsens the fit. All of the observations
in the UK and 97% in France are estimated to have quasi-concave preferences and
positive marginal utility of income.
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3.8.4 Elasticities simulation:
Using the parameters of the utility function I simulate labour supply elasticities by
increasing the hourly cost of work to the employer (i.e wages) by 1%:
Model UK France
Elasticities Intensive Participation Intensive Participation
All .56 .34 .45 .38
Youngest kid 0 to 3 1.01 .73 .70 .62
Youngest kid 3 to 6 .89 .61 .47 .41
Youngest kid 6 to 18 .49 .30 .44 .36
No kids .29 .16 .33 .27
Table 3.5: Wage Elasticities
Intensive elasticities measure the percentage increase in hours of work amongst those
observed working, and participation elasticities measure the percentage point increase
in the employment rate. The elasticities appear generally higher in the UK. This
probably reflects the more flexible labour market that allows women to adjust their
labour supply more easily. In the UK, the magnitude of elasticities vary tremendously
with the composition of the households. In the presence of young children, British
women become extremely responsive to financial incentives and as children age, they
become less and less responsive. This is not the case in France, only when children
are of pre-school age (below three years old) do the elasticities increase moderately.
The elasticities are in line with the results found in the literature. Blundell et al
(1998) find wage elasticities for UK married women in the range [.14,.37]. Following
a similar approach to that paper, Blundell et al (2012) find very close elasticities.
Still on UK data, with models accounting for demand-side constraints, Arellano and
Meghir (1992) obtain a range [.29,.71], Blundell et al (1987) recover a mean elasticity
of .31. Using 2001 Euromod data, Bargain et al (2012) recover (net) wage elasticities
of .09 (UK),.13 (France) and participation elasticities of .07 (UK) and .10 (France).
Finally, Laroque and Salanie (2002) recover a participation elasticity of .82 on French
data.
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It is important to note that having a kid of pre-school versus a kid of school age
multiplies the elasticity magnitude by a factor of roughly two in France and more
than three in the UK. The presence of pre-school kids in the household make British
mothers far more sensitive to financial incentives than French mothers, particularly
along the intensive margin.
The model specification allows me to esimate what proportion of women would be
willing to work but cannot find work. In the UK, I estimate that 6.0% of women in
the sample are in a such a situation (out of 26.6% not working). The Labour Force
Survey asks women if they are looking for work, or if they would be willing to work
but are not looking (this may be thought of as a proxy for discouraged workers).
Using the answers to these questions, it appears that 7.6% of the women are actually
constrained. In France, such information is not available, but my model allows me to
estimate that about 7.4% of women in the sample are constrained (out of 27.7% not
working).
I also recover the income elasticities by simulating the response to a 1% increase in
outside of work income. Once again, women in the UK are more responsive to financial
incentives than in France (especially along the intensive margin). It should be noted
that in France the income elasticities are extremely similar between the extensive
and intensive response. In the UK, women have higher income elasticites along the
intensive margin than the extensive margin. This suggests that hours worked by
women are likely to be more sensitive to husband’s income in the UK than in France.
Model UK France
Elasticities Intensive Participation Intensive Participation
All -.22 -.13 -.13 -.12
Youngest kid 0 to 3 -.36 -.24 -.13 -.14
Youngest kid 3 to 6 -.33 -.22 -.19 -.18
Youngest kid 6 to 18 -.21 -.12 -.15 -.14
No kids -.11 -.06 -.05 -.04
Table 3.6: Income elasticities
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3.8.5 Part-time wage penalties:
I use the wage equation estimates to infer the part-time hourly wage penalties for
each woman in the sample. When a woman is observed working, I can predict exactly
her wage at every hours, when not working, I predict the wages for each draw and,
calculate the wage penalty at that draw and average it over all the draws. The
following Table 3.7 report the average part-time wage penalties in the sample:
% Diﬀerence between: W20 and WFt W30 and WFt
UK France UK France
All 1.6% -7.1% -2.7% -4.5%
Education level:
Below GCSE -0.1% -1.6% -7.2% -11.1%
GCSE 1.1% -10.3% -4.6% -4.8%
A-levels 0.0% -11.4% -1.8% -1.6%
Higher education 5.6% -8.8% 2.7% 2.9%
University 3.3% 3.6% 0.0% -4.9%
Table 3.7: Part-time wage penalties
In the UK, there does not seem to be any part-time wage penalty at 20 hours of
work, while it is relatively small at 30 hours of work (most of the gap coming from
low educated women). The part-time wage penalty seems to be bigger in France, and
especially when working 20 hours a week. By working 20 hours a week instead of
full-time, French women seem to suﬀer from very large wage penalties. This probably
reflects the lack of flexibility of employers to let them freely choose their hours, and
the fact that they may have to accept diﬀerent jobs when working half-time instead
of full-time.
3.8.6 Tax rate distribution in the economy
By using the tax algorithm and the wage equation estimates, I infer on the French data
the average and marginal tax rates faced by the women at each hours choice, under
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the French tax-benefit system and under the UK tax-benefit system. For each woman
I subtract the latter to the former. I reproduce the distribution of this diﬀerence in
tax rates across the two countries for the same set of women in Figures 3.23 and 3.24:
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Figure 3.23: Extra average (partici-
pation) tax rates faced under the
French system
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Figure 3.24: Extra marginal tax
rates under the French system
Most women face higher marginal tax rates in France than in the UK, and they nearly
all face higher average (participation) tax rates, which confirms the observations of
section 5.
3.9 Explaining the observed hours gap:
In this section, I conduct a series of policy experiments to identify the institutions
and parameters that could explain the cross-country hours diﬀerence.
3.9.1 Passing the French system on the UK data:
Here I conduct a policy exercise replacing the UK tax-benefit system with the French
tax-benefit system on the UK dataset, using the parameters estimates from the model
above. I conduct three experiments: substitute only the childcare price distribution
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(keeping the UK tax system intact except for childcare subsidies provided through
the Working Tax Credit), substitute the tax system and substitute both. The details
of the changes are reported in Table 3.18 in the appendix.
By substituting the UK childcare system for the French one, average hours increase
by a percentage point, all the eﬀect comes from mothers of pre-school kids who would
increase their hours of work by 9.12%. This result is particularly strong considering
the model specification and data limitations (remember that I cannot control properly
for the costs of childcare in London versus the rest of the country). The eﬀect is
particularly strong along the extensive margin and the decision to work full-time. This
finding goes a long the way in the direction of the hypothesis that British mothers
reduce their hours of work due to high childcare costs.
When faced with the French tax system, British women would reduce their hours of
work by nearly 15%. The impact is particularly dramatic on mothers of pre-school
children, which can be explained by the relatively high sensitivity of that population
to financial incentives (as reflected by the estimated elaticities discussed earlier). The
participation rate would fall for all categories. The most dramatic change appears to
be the fall in full-time work (that would be partly compensated by a rise in part-time
work for households without children).
3.9.2 Passing the UK system on French data:
Here I replace the French system with the UK system on the French dataset, using the
parameters estimates from the model above. I conduct the same three experiments
as in the section above: substituting only the childcare price distribution (keeping
the French tax system intact except that I impute the childcare subsidies the woman
would receive under the UK tax system and subtract them from the gross UK childcare
cost), substitute the tax system only, and substitute both. Again the detailed results
are in Table 3.19 in the appendix.
When the net childcare costs in France are replaced with the net UK childcare costs
that the woman would incur if in the UK, the hours of work for mothers of pre-school
children fall by about 11%. For mothers of children above three the impact is far
more limited.
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By Substituting the French tax-benefit system for the UK one and keeping the French
childcare distribution. This budget constraint combines the low UK tax rates with
low French childcare prices. women increase their hours of work by more than 12%.
The impact is particularly dramatic on mothers of pre-school children (about 32%)
and around 7% to 10% increase for the other women.
When the budget constraint is the UK childcare distribution and the UK tax system,
the impact is more mitigated. The UK childcare prices have a dramatic impact,
reducing by nearly half the gains on pre-school kid mothers and even decreasing the
hours (compared to French system base case) of mothers with kids between the age
of three and six. These women in France would put their kids in school and (in my
model) incur no childcare costs. As discussed earlier, in France, the childcare costs
observed in the DREES survey by this category were relatively small and I ignored
them in my model.
3.9.3 Understanding the results:
Figure 3.25 should make the main results of this section clearer:
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FR sample with UK tax,UK cc
Average Hours of Work, per age of youngest kid
Figure 3.25: Interchangeing the tax systems cannot explain the observed gap in
hours
Generally, the UK tax system pushes a lot of married women to enter the labour
force , specifically in couples where the youngest child is less than three years old.
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This makes sense, as we saw in section 3, once in the labour market, the intensive
margin of work is hardly influenced by the age of the youngest child in France. The
benefits for mothers of young children PAJE who decide to stay at home are quite
generous in France and have a strong impact on the decision to return to work after
a child-birth (as found in the first chapter and by Piketty (2005)). In the UK system,
the incentives to stay at home for mothers of young children are much smaller, and
therefore, this pushes a lot of women with pre-school kids to enter the labour force.
On the one hand, the UK tax system is designed to incentivise part-time work through
the Working Tax Credit scheme. Nevertheless, under the UK tax system, part-time
work would fall for most married women. Most of the rise in hours would be due to
a rise in full-time work. The tax credits that encourage part-time work are means-
tested, and were particularly designed for low productive single mothers. The level of
these subsidies for the married women in my sample are probably too small to have
an impact on their labour supply choices. On the other hand, the introduction of
UK childcare prices causes the full-time and 30 hours choices to fall and only the 20
hours margin to slightly increase. So childcare prices in the UK push married mothers
either out of the labour market or towards part-time jobs, while the UK tax system
pushes them into the labour force and particularly in full-time jobs.
In the French system the high incentives to stay out of the labour force are balanced
by cheap childcare prices. The magnitude of their respective impact on the aggregate
hours of work for mothers with pre-school children appear similar.
3.9.4 Comparison of the net weekly childcare prices distribution:
To better illustrate the diﬀerence in childcare prices across the two countries, I use
the wage predictions from the model to impute what each French woman’s childcare
subsidy would be if she lived under the UK tax system and gross childcare price
distribution. I can use this to simulate the net childcare cost distribution for French
women under UK taxes and childcare prices, and compare it to the French equivalent.
Figures 3.26 and 3.27 represent the ratio of the expected childcare costs at each hours
choice in France to the one in the UK on the sample of French women.
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Figure 3.26: Ratio of net childcare prices: UK to France
The net childcare costs for households with kids younger than three doubles to triples
between the UK and France. This is in line with the findings from studies discussed
in section 6 and can explain all the observed gap in hours worked for households with
these children.
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Figure 3.27: French childcare prices in the UK
Despite these huge diﬀerences, the childcare prices on their own cannot explain a lot
of the diﬀerence when the youngest child is 3 to 6 years old.
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3.9.5 The importance of outside work income levels
The British women hours of work may also be lower if the income outside work for
them are relatively higher. To check this possibility, I substitute in each country the
income outside work with the one that would be available to the women under the
other country’s tax schedule. But at each positive hour choice, I keep the country-
specific “slope” of the budget constraint. I eﬀectively shift the entire budget constraint
down for (most) British women and up for (most) French women. The tax rates being
lower in the UK, it appears that husbands (with slightly higher hours of work and
wages) end up bringing more income home under the UK tax-benefit system. The
exact details are reported in Tables 3.20 and 3.21 in the appendix.
Figure 3.28 shows the results when only the income outside work are modified.
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Figure 3.28: Substituting only the outside work income of each country
Modifying the income outside work in France to match the one in the UK system has
a small eﬀect, it decreases the probability of working at any hours choice. By shifting
the budget constraint up for French women, hours of work decrease as expected. The
impact on mothers of pre-school children is particularly small. Most of the changes
seem to occur along the decision to work full-time in households and is strongest when
children are three to six years old.
When this diﬀerence in outside work income is combined with the childcare prices
diﬀerence, the eﬀects are more sizable as illustrated in the graph below
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Figure 3.29: Combining childcare prices and outside-work incomes could explain
most of the observed gap in hours
When UK childcare is introduced, the changes are particularly dramatic for French
women. The large fall in full-time work for mothers of kids between the age of 3 to 6 is
particularly striking. The income eﬀect due to a rise in outside work income combined
with the substitution eﬀect due to a rise in the hourly childcare costs tremendously
aﬀects the labour supply decision for mothers with young children. All the observed
gap in hours for that demographic group is closed. Overall, the interaction of outside-
work income and childcare prices could reduce all the observed hours gap for mothers.
3.9.6 Wages and part-time wage penalties:
The part-time wage penalty appears stronger in France. I substitute the part-time
wage penalty of each country and predict the hours of work.
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Figure 3.30: Role of part-time wage penalties
The impact of part-time wage penalties appears to be very limited on French women
(and is not reported in Figure 3.30 for clarity) and stronger on UK women. It could
explain half the diﬀerence observed for pre-school children, but very little for the rest
of the marrid women population. As we saw above, the penalty to working part-time
is very limited in the UK, but relatively important in France. So it makes perfect
sense that the UK women, in the presence of young children, are not afraid of reducing
their hours worked when facing the UK wage structure of low part-time penalties.
3.9.7 The true diﬀerence in labour supply is much wider:
It is diﬃcult to truly identify the impact of each institution on the aggregate hours
worked as it interacts with the rest of the system and environment faced by individuals.
The interaction of childcare prices and income outside of work could close the observed
hours gap. Lower part-time wage penalties and in the UK could also help explain some
of the diﬀerences for mothers of very young children. Nevertheless, preferences in each
country may diﬀer, and to illustrate that possibility, I predict the hours of work on
the sample of UK women replacing the preference parameters by the ones estimated
in France (the line “UK sample FR preferences” in Figure 3.31). The results are
striking. The underlying labour supply gap is much wider than observed in the data.
I also pass the French tax-benefit (and childcare) system, and adjust the full-time
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hours of work (to reflect the 35 hours week in France) for an additional check.
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UK sample with FR Preferences, FR system & FR full−time hours
Average Hours of Work UK sample, per age of youngest kid
Figure 3.31: Diﬀerences in labour supply due to preferences
The line “UK sample FR preferences” in the graph above represents to a certain
extent “French women substited with UK women keeping everything else in the UK
household environment fixed”. The diﬀerence between the second line “UK sample
FR preferences,FR system & full-time hours” and the observed hours in the French
sample should account for potential diﬀerences in the population structure, varying
demand-side and husband characteristics. For women with children younger than six,
the gap is completly closed. A discrepancy persists for women with a child older
than six and no children. We saw earlier that diﬀerences in the wives wage structure
seem to play a minimal role in the cross-country diﬀerences. The estimated demand-
side constraints are very similar in both countries as illustrated in Figure 3.35 in the
appendix. The wages of husbands (but not the working hours) diﬀer quite strongly
in the UK between these two groups and less so in France (Figures 3.32 and 3.33).
A simple income eﬀect (from lower husbands earnings) for married women with no
children could explain why they would work more (and those whose child is older than
six would work less) than the observed hours in the French sample.
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Figure 3.32: Wages of husbands per
age of youngest child
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Figure 3.33: Hours of husbands per
age of youngest child
These results suggest that the preferences in the UK for leisure are much stronger
than in France for married women with children (and particularly young children).
3.9.8 Summary:
In both countries, the French tax system appears to sligthly depress average total
hours. Women in France generally work more despite these high taxes. All of the
gap in observed hours for households with pre-school children can be accounted for
by cheaper childcare costs in France. Under the UK tax system, the higher income
brought home by husbands has a small negative income eﬀect, slightly depressing
hours worked by married women. But all of the aggregate hours gap can be accounted
for by the interaction of higher outside work income and higher childcare prices in the
British system. Furthermore, in the presence of young children, women in the UK face
lower part-time wage penalties, which also depresses their hours of work. However,
this analysis suggests the main driver of lower hours worked by British married women
is explained by higher preferences for leisure in the presence of children. Particularly
when young children are in the household. This finding makes sense if one believes
that country-specific institutions reflect the underlying preferences of the population:
in this case, British mothers value leisure more than French mothers and as a result,
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availability of cheap and accessible childcare facilities are not a priority of policy
makers trying to maximize the welfare of the population.
The results also suggest that in France, women are less sensitive to financial incentives
along the intensive margin than in the UK. This might reflect a two-tier labour market
where outsiders find it diﬃcult to enter full-time positions, and full-time workers are
privileged and reluctant to adjust their working hours down.
3.10 Conclusion:
In this paper, I documented and looked for an explanation as to why prime-aged
women in the UK have lower hours of work than in France. Focusing on a compara-
ble demographic group (married women with employed husbands), it is particularly
striking to observe the extent to which the intensive margins of work diﬀer in the pres-
ence of children across the Channel. I show that neither tax rates nor labour market
constraints can come close to explaining what I observe in the data. It appears that
wage penalties, income outside work (husbands earnings and transfers) and especially
childcare prices play an important role in explaining the cross-country diﬀerences.
Yet, mothers of young children in the UK are far more responsive to financial incen-
tives than in France. Concluding that preferences diﬀer and that mothers in the UK
have much higher preferences for leisure may still be too simplistic. One aspect that is
not modelled very well in this study is the choice of childcare and childcare infrastruc-
tures available in the UK might be of lower quality. In this case, the intrinsic mothers’
tastes for leisure may not diﬀer in the two countries. In both countries, the mothers
may have similar tastes for childcare arrangements but if the childcare quality in the
UK is much lower, UK mothers may prefer to stay home and look after their children
(especially when working part-time is not associated with a substantial wage penalty).
Unfortunately with the data available, I cannot identity if pure tastes for leisure, or
quality and availability of childcare, are driving the results. More generally, as dis-
cussed by Heim & Meyer (2004), these types of structural models cannot perfectly
diﬀerentiate the true underlying preferences from costs of work. The intra-household
allocation may also diﬀer within the two countries, although this does not appear to
be a convincing explanation. The employment rates and hours of work of husbands
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are very similar in both countries and insensitive to the presence of children in the
household. This paper highlighted the diﬃculty of modeling and finding one “key”
factor to understand cross-country hours of work diﬀerences.This study abstracted
from life-cycle decisions. The woman’s labour supply during the child-rearing years
may impact her labour supply choices later on in her life (especially for retirement
decisions), and further research in that direction would be welcome.
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Appendix:
Sample statistics:
UK France
% of prime-aged women per marital status
Single 27 % 21 %
In couple, not married 15 % 23 %
Married 57 % 56 %
Married Women
Kids distribution
0 28 % 24 %
1 26 % 28 %
2 33 % 33 %
3 & above 13 % 15 %
Education distribution:
Below High-school degree 49 % 49 %
High school degree 16 % 18 %
Above High-school degree 35 % 33 %
Husbands labour supply:
Average hours of husbands
household with 0 kids 43 40
household with 2 kids 43 40
Employment rate of husbands
household with 0 kids 89 % 93 %
household with 2 kids 91 % 93 %
Table 3.8: Prime-age married women characteristics
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Constraints on intensive margin Constraints on extensive margin
UK France UK France
% working & answering “yes” Non-working actively looking
Would you like to work more? 5% 22 % % in the population 3.5% 8 %
Would you like to work less? 25% 4 % Median duration of search 4 months 12 months
Table 3.9: Employment constraints for women in the sample
143
Chapter 3 Why do married women work less in the UK than in France?
Child-care first-stage regressions:
The UK:
I follow the specification of Blundell et al(1999) and define six groups according to the
age of the youngest kid and the number of children. The following Table 3.10 presents
the childcare hourly cost (per child) distribution among women observed working:
Price range 0 ]0,2] [2,3[ [3,4[ [4,5] >5
1 child,age of youngest<3 .56 .05 .08 .15 .07 .08
2 children,age of youngest<3 .50 .11 .08 .14 .08 .09
2+children,age of youngest<3 .63 .10 .10 .06 .04 .06
1 child,age of youngest 3 or more .93 .03 .02 .01 .01 .00
2 children,age of youngest 3 or more .93 .03 .02 .01 .01 .00
2+children,age of youngest 3 or more .94 .03 .01 .01 .00 .00
Table 3.10: Frequency in price range (Pounds)
constant (s.e) slope (s.e)
1 child,age of youngest<3 6.49647 (2.42185) .3947476 (.120124)
2 children,age of youngest<3 9.683139 (2.335399) .24624 (.0867135)
2+children,age of youngest<3 11.77743 (2.958219) .2084117 (.0991119)
1 child,age of youngest 3 or more 7.87098 (2.166104) .6158683 (.0708488)
2 children,age of youngest 3 or more 10.72665 (2.751551) .3829336 (.1375437)
2+children,age of youngest 3 or more 13.74182 (2.200187) .2341691 (.0855256)
Table 3.11: Hours of childcare per child and hours of work
France
The four income groups each contain about a quarter of the households, households
with disposable incomes below 2000€ belong to group 1, households with disposable
incomes between 2000€ and 3000€ belong to group 2, households with disposable
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incomes between 3000€ and 4000€ to group 3, and households with disposable income
above 4000€ to group 4. The following Table 3.12 presents the childcare hourly cost
(per child) distribution for each household group:
Price range 0 ]0,.5] ].5,1] ]1,1.5] ]1.5,2] >2
Income group 1 .45 .26 .17 .06 .01 .05
Income group 2 .32 .18 .35 .08 .03 .04
Income group 3 .16 .18 .32 .16 .11 .06
Income group 4 .11 .06 .16 .21 .17 .29
Table 3.12: Frequency in price range (Euros)
constant (s.e) slope (s.e)
Income group 1 7.80323 (3.974517) .2461619 (.1215633)
Income group 2 8.23608 (2.973548) .3805881 (.0921147)
Income group 3 20.42692 (3.111333) .1666463 (.0936205)
Income group 4 16.16387 (3.17261) .4512845 (.0898695)
Table 3.13: Hours of childcare per child and hours of work:
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Model parameter estimates:
UK France
Parameter (s.e) Parameter (s.e)
βy : age -.1834980 (.1545923) -.0211404 ( .3442384)
age squared .3719474 (.3444026) .0956037 (1.081601)
London/Paris -.0051280 (.0745972) .0634008 (.1172478)
left school before 16 y.o .0404415 (.0381775) -.2830348 (.1394994)
constant 2.0858813 (.5273075) 2.109509 (1.12682)
βh: age -.0332968 (.0203903) .0319474 (.0462901)
age squared .0993989 (.0518303) -.1739887 (.1488431)
London/Paris .0150711 (.0214734) .0328435 (.017699)
age of youngest kid 0 to3 -.0602280 (.0057956) .0005985 (.009133)
age of youngest kid 3 to6 -.0603199 (.0057129) -.0153598 (.0079)
number of dependent kids -.0226926 (.0018464) -.0355333 (.003013)
left school before 16 y.o -.0147232 (.0062411) .0513159 ( .0207549)
constant 1.0998930 (.9433046) -.5106735 (.1581345)
αy: .000814 (.0011100) -.038754 (.006096)
αh: -.0218845 (.0184523) .005777 (.0009167)
αyh: -.0056113 (.0005466) .0079727 (.0016939)
ρ: 1.1959939 (.1865373) .0268267 (.1254705)
Note: income was divided by 100 in France and 100 in the UK
Table 3.14: Utility functions
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UK France
Parameter (s.e) Parameter (s.e)
FC constant 8.7093683 (7.5448630) -1.834302 (.3826994)
London/Paris 1.5886867 (.7622172) .9096733 (.2218583)
age of youngest kid 0 to3 -0.5395082 (.1713858) .2855556 (.2106917)
age of youngest kid 3 to6 -0.5970919 (.1690701) .0210882 (.1884332)
number of kids -0.2858000 (.0595358) -.4555657 (.0764048)
FC full-time -4.7899996 (2.9549559) -.5366605 (.079718)
Table 3.15: Fixed costs of work
UK France
Parameter (s.e) Parameter (s.e)
Local unemployment rate 6.8421918 (3.8711417) -11.70016 (2.183749)
Age -.1855728 (.0762443) .2319446 (.0923116)
Constant 1.6983575 (.3842822) 1.40013 (.3432415)
Table 3.16: Employment probabilities
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Table 3.17: Wage equations
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Income tax calculation in France: The taxable income is the net salary and other
sources of income (especially financial, and/or housing) that we will ignore. To be
more precise, you are taxable on your net salary, to which the CRDS need be included
and part of the CSG.
To understand the calculations, the best thing is to look at the tax form. I will
attempt to explain clearly the procedure here. From the sum of your net salary and
your partner’s (if any), 10% are deducted as non taxable (this deduction is a minimum
of 401€ and cannot exceed 13,501€ ). From there, an extra 5.8% are deducted (part
of the CSG). Further deductions apply but will not be considered. By applying these
deductions we have now defined the taxable income.
Now, the specificities of the French system kick in. First of all, you are assigned a
number of “parts” linked to your household demographics ( for example, a married
couple has 2 parts, a single person 1 part, the first kid brings an extra half part, the
second kid as well, and every other kid brings a full part). With the taxable income
and the number of parts N , you obtain your family ratio “Quotient familial” as the
ratio of taxable income on the number of parts. If your taxable income is below a
part-specific level, you are not taxable ( for instance, with 2.5 parts, if household
income is < 19,300€ ).
If your household is entitled to pay taxes, its family ratio has to be multiplied by
a specific rate (that increases by thresholds) to which is taken out a constant sum
(specific to the rate) multiplied by the number of parts. For example if your family
ratio is below 5,687€ you pay nothing. If it is between 5,687€ and 11,344€ (11,673€),
your income tax is:
(taxable income ∗ .055)− (321.86 ∗N)
If it is above 67,546€ (69,505€) your taxable income is multiplied by .4 and the number
of parts by 12,063€ .
That income tax is now subject to a maximum value (“plafonnement”) or roof. If
your income tax is above the “plafonnement” C you pay the income tax, if C is higher
than that income tax obtained previously, you pay C. To determine C, you have to
calculate the income tax you would be liable to, if you did not have children in the
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household, from which is deducted a constant term that varies with the number of
people in the household. For instance, a married couple with two kids will take out
3,852€ + 4,454€ . This “plafonnement” aﬀects the top end of the income distribution
only.
Last but not least, for low income households, if your taxable income is below 838€,
you are entitled to a discount equal to:
419€- income tax2
Your final income tax is then the previous value to which the discount is taken out.
Social contributions paid by the employee: These contributions vary with a thresh-
old called “plafond”. In 2007, the threshold for monthly salary was 2,682€. On their
gross salary, employees pay 6.65% for “old age insurance” below the threshold, .75%
for “sickness, invalid insurance”, and .10% for “widow insurance” on the entire salary.
Regarding unemployment insurance, workers pay 2.40% up to 4 times the threshold,
0.024% between 1 and 4 times the threshold, and 7.72€ a year for APEC. For retire-
ment, she pays 3% up to the threshold, and 8% between 1 and 3 times the threshold
(7.70% between 1 and 8 times the threshold if not an executive).She pays .80% up
to the threshold and .90% between 1 and 3 times the threshold ( 4 times the thresh-
old if an executive) towards AGFF. Finally, on 97% of the gross salary, workers pay
2.40% for the CSG (which are not deductible from income tax), 5.10% for the CSG
(deductible from income tax), and 0.50% of CRDS.
Social contributions paid by the employer: The employer pays 12.80% of the gross
salary for the “sickness, invalid,death insurance” on the entire salary . For the “old age
insurance”, 8.30% up to the first threshold and 1.60% on the whole salary. Also pays
5.40% for family benefits (allocations familiales). All companies pay .10% until the
threshold towards the National housing fund. Regarding unemployment insurance,
employers pay 4% up to 4 times the threshold.
As to retirement, for non-executives they pay 4.50% up to the threshold and 12%
between 1 and 3 times the threshold. For executives the pay 1.50% and 4.50% up to
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the threshold, and 12.60% between 1 and 8 times the threshold. They also pay .22%
of CET up to 8 times the threshold. Firms pay 1.20% up to the threshold and 1.30%
between 1 and 3 (4 for executives) times the threshold to the AGFF.
The following graphs shows the total social contributions on hourly productivity at
full-time work:
.
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Social contributions’share of wages at full−time work
Figure 3.34: Social contributions as a share of total compensation
Housing benefits in France:
General introduction: There are 3 diﬀerent types of housing benefits that can be
paid to people renting their house or paying mortgage interests. The “Allocation de
logement social” and “Allocation de logement familial” for people in private housing,
and the “Allocation personnalisee au logement” for people in public housing.
The calculation of resources takes into account: taxable income (impot sur le revenu)
of which the RMI is deducted.
The size of the transfer is equal to the rent and housing costs of which are taken out a
personal participation (“Participation personnelle du beneficiaire”). So the important
part is this personal participation calculated as the sum of a minimum participation
(min(30€, 8.5%(applicable rent + charges)) and a complement (“participation person-
nalisee”) that depends on the household demographics, the rent and resources. This
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complement is calculated by adding a family rate, and a rent rate both multiplied by
a coeﬃcient linked to the pull of resources. To sum up:
AL = rent and charges (L+ C)− Personal Participation
Personal Part. = min.participation+ complement
I will assume that all household are renting. This will simplify the calculation (already
complicated) of the benefits (assuming some are owners repaying mortgages would
imply diﬀerent assumptions about the mortgage type, rates and more).
Rent and charges allowances: The maximum (“roof”) monthly rent L for someone
in a zone 2 area (urban outside Greater Paris) are in 2007: 229.07€ if you live alone,
280.38 € if in couple, household (couple or not) with one child 315.50€, two children
361.41€, three children 407.32€, and 45.91€ per extra kid.
The charges C are 47.82€ for households with no children, 58.64€ with one child, add
10.82€ for every extra kid.
Personal participation: It is obtained by the formula:
Pp = P0 + Tp ∗Rp
Where P0 is the minimum participation defined as:
P0 = min(30, 8.5% of (L+ C))
Also, Rpis the diﬀerence between the household’s resources and threshold R0 defined
as a percentage of the yearly RMI and BMAF 2007 from which are deducted 10% and
20%. To be clearer, in 2007, R0 was for a single person 3,234€, for a couple 4,631€,
with one kid 5,525€, with 2 kids 5,627€, with 3 kids 5,818€ and an extra 190€ per
extra kid.
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Last but not least is Tp, the rate applicable. It is defined as:
Tp = Tf + Tl
where Tf depends on the household size (3.54 if alone, 3.94 if couple, 3.38 with one kid,
2.97 with 2 kids, 2.51 with 3 kids, 2,31 with 4 kids, 2.24 with 5 kids, and -0.07 per extra
kid). Now, for Tl, first you need to calculate the ratio RL = Rent paid ormax rent allowedreference rent
if that ratio is below .45 it is equal to Tl., if it’s between .45 and .75 it has to be
multiplied and subtracted to specific constants provided in the calculation form.
Final transfer: Once AL has been calculated, it is taxed by the CRDS at 0.5% so
the final benefit you are entitled to (which will be directly transferred to your landlord
and deducted from your rent due!) is equal to .995*AL.
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Estimated employment probabilities in France and the UK:
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Figure 3.35: Employment probabilities
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4 Marriage penalty in France
4.1 Overview
In this chapter, I study the impact of the marriage penalty on labour supply choices
of married women with working husbands. Using the model estimated in the previous
chapter, I simulate a revenue-neutral reform that would cancel the tax penalty or gain
associated with being married. I find that the the participation rate of these women
would increase by 0.7 percentage point and their overall labour supply would increase
by 1.2%. As expected, the changes would be larger for highly educated women and
those married to a high-earner.
4.2 Introduction:
In the UK, the debate around joint-taxation was recently revived with the Conser-
vative party’s proposition to introduce a small tax-break for married couples where
one of the spouses does not work. The UK moved from a joint taxation to an indi-
vidual taxation system for couples in 1990. The desire to come back to a non-neutral
treatment of marriage in the tax system appears driven by pure politics more than
economics.
France provides an interesting environment to study how the specific treatment of
marital status may aﬀect wives’ labour supply decisions. This chapter focuses on
the impact of joint-taxation on married women’s tax rates and how it depresses their
labour supply. I simulate a revenue-neutral reform that would treat married and
cohabiting couples equally. I find that under such a system, the employment rate of
married women would increase by 0.7 percentage points and the total hours worked
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by married women would increase by 1.2%. This eﬀect comes not only from the
decrease in marginal (and average) tax rates in households where the wife earns less
than her husband, but also from the increase in the first threshold for taxable earnings
simulated for the revenue-neutrality. Such a change in the tax schedule would also
impact workers in non-married households (and maybe husbands’s labour supply as
well as intra-household allocations), but the labour supply model used, does not allow
me to address these issues. The results here are slightly more modest than what was
found in the literature. The reform I simulate cannot be thought of as a full move
from joint to individual taxation in the French tax system. It is best described as a
decrease in the jointness of the system for married households.
The empirical evidence on the impact of joint-taxation on married women labour
supply is relatively scarce. This is mainly explained by the lack of available tax
reforms. LaLumia (2008) studies the U.S. switch to joint taxation in 1948. She finds
a small and statistical significant reduction in the labour force participation of married
women (about 2 percentage points) and no changes in the labour supply of husbands.
The reform happened in 1948 and women attitudes to work have dramatically changed
since (as reflected by the increase in their participation rates observed in the 1970’s and
1980’s). In Canada, Crossley and Jeon (2007), exploit a reduction in the jointness
of the Canadian tax system in 1988. In an approach similar to Eissa (1995), they
compare the reaction of women married to higher income husbands with those married
to lower income husbands. Their results suggest that the reform increased the labour
force participation of low education women married to higher income husbands by 9
to 10 percentage points. Bach et al (2010) simulate a move from joint to individual
taxation in Germany and predict and increase by about 2.4 percentage points of
married women participation, while for men it would decrease by about 0.3 percentage
points. The average working hours of women would increase by about 7.4 percent
and decrease by 1.5 percent for men. Selin (2009) focuses on the shift from joint to
individual taxation in Sweden in 1971. He estimates a labour supply model and then
simulates the eﬀects of the reform to recover very large eﬀects (about 10 percentage
points). More recently, Kaliskova (2013) focuses on the Czech move from individual
to joint taxation in 2005. She uses a Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ method where the treated groups are
married women with children and the control groups unmarried and childless or Slovak
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married women. Her results suggest that the reform decreased the participation rate
of women by 2.9 percentage points, with higher eﬀects for women married to earners
in the top quartile of the wage distribution.
Section 3 of the chapter describes how the French tax system may increase or decrease
the tax bill of married households depending on their characteristics. Section 4 sim-
ulates the labour supply reaction of married women to a potential reform removing
the diﬀerence between cohabiting and married couples in the tax system.
4.3 Impact of the marriage penalty/gain on the labour
supply of married women:
In France, the family-based income tax system was established in 1945 through the
Quotient Familial. The details of the Quotient familial are described in chapter 3. Its
creator Adolphe Landry summarised it as follows: “An equal tax rate for equal living
costs”. It aims to ensure horizontal equity, that is tax neutrality among households
having a globally equivalent revenue, whatever their composition. By providing tax
incentives in connection with marriage and birth rate it also aims to aﬀect fertility.
I described the details of the calculation in the third chapter. Married couples may
benefit from that Quotient Familial, especially when the intra-household earnings’
inequality is wide or only one adult works. The taxe d’habitation (council tax) also
includes a discount for married households. The tax rebate increases with the number
of parts in the households, and it is important to account for it, especially for low-
income households who are not subject to the income tax but are still subject to the
taxe d’habitation. These two specificities of the French system are likely to aﬀect the
labour supply decision of married women as the marginal tax rates they face depends
on their husbands earnings.
4.3.1 Context
The sample from Enquete Emploi en Continu 2007 is the same as the one used in the
previous chapter to compare the French and British systems. The joint taxation, may
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aﬀect the tax rates paid by women, compared to the situation where the couple would
not be married. It could increase the marginal tax rates (if the husband has a very
income say), or it could also decrease it (the Quotient familial is a rebate on taxable
income). To illustrate this point, I impute the tax rates that married working women
in my sample would face if there were living in unmarried couples. I subtract it to the
observed tax rate and recover a distribution of this marriage penalty/gain. In figures
4.1 and 4.2 positive number means that her tax rate is higher when she is married
(marriage penalty). About half of working married women, face a higher marginal
tax rate because of their marital status. 21% are neither penalized nor benefiting,
and 29% face a lower marginal tax rate. Among the non-working women, should they
work full-time, the respective numbers are 60%, 0%, 40%. In order to calculate their
expected tax rate penalties, I have inferred their wages at Full-time work and assumed
they were working Full-time.
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Looking at the distribution of intra-household wage inequality in the sample helps to
visualize better what share of married women might be concerned. In the following,
I calculate the ratio of husbands’ hourly wage to his wife’s hourly wage. The wage
represents the cost of work to the employer (the productivity of the worker). I report
the intra-household wage inequality distribution only for couples where the wife is
employed. It is interesting to note that the proportion of households where the wife
earns more than the husband is not negligible.
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of intra-household wage inequality for married couples with
two workers
4.3.2 results:
In this section I simulate a revenue-neutral reform where married and cohabiting
couples are now taxed similarly. Overall, this would increase the participation rate of
married women with working husbands by 0.7 percentage points, and increase their
total hours of work by 1.2%. As discussed earlier, one might expect that most of the
labour supply responses would be concentrated among households with large intra-
household wage inequality, or where the husbands’ earnings are large. I report the
results along diﬀerent household characteristics in Tables 4.1 to 4.4 in the appendix.
Along the age of the youngest child dimension:
Women with a pre-school age child respond most strongly to the reform (which could
be expected as their labour supply elasticity is the largest). The size of the response is
very similar when the youngest is above six years old or when there are no dependent
children.
Across diﬀerent education groups:
As the education level increases, the reform’s impact becomes larger. More educated
women tend to be married to educated husbands and are more likely to be aﬀected
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by the income tax than low educated households (whose earnings are probably too
low to be liable to the income tax).
Along diﬀerent husband earnings groups:
Here it appears that women with high-earnings husbands would have lower marginal
and participation tax rates if not married. In households where the husbands is in
the upper-quarter of the wage distribution, wives would increase their participation
rate by nearly 2.2 percentage points.
Along diﬀerent intra-household earnings inequality groups:
For women observed not-working, I predict their wages at each draw, take the ratio
of that predicted wage to her husband’s and then average it out over all the draws.
I separate the groups into four groups of roughly the same size. It might appear
surprising that women who earn more than their husband increase their labour supply,
but imposing the revenue-neutrality condition through higher thresholds for taxable
income, decreases the average tax rates for women in this group, and induce some of
them to increase their labour supply.
4.4 Conclusion:
This chapter, simulated a revenue-neutral tax reform canceling the diﬀerence in tax
treatments between married and cohabiting households. It appeared to have small
positive eﬀects on the overall labour supply of married women with working husbands.
The policy simulations suggests that the joint taxation of married couples diminishes
overall hours worked by 1.2% for this group of women. The simulated impact of the
reform are lower than what the limited literature on the subject suggests. This can
probably be explained by the diﬀerence in the reforms studied. While most studies
focus on the transition from a joint to individual system, this chapter only focused
on reducing the jointness of the French tax system. It may be important to keep in
mind that the model used did not allow for any reaction of husband’s labour supply.
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Table 4.4: Labour supply responses by intra-houshehold wage inequality distribution
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